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1. Introduction
1 
The  interbank  market  is  crucial  for  the  correct  functioning  of  all  financial  system,  for 
implementing monetary policy, and for successive borrowing conditions of households and firms. Its 
malfunctioning in several systems during the crisis is accordingly a cause of concern (Allen and 
Carletti, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009; Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen, 2009). This paper joins the 
debate with empirical  inquiry  into: (a) the characteristics that banks consider in assessing other 
banks’ creditworthiness; and (b) any modifications of characteristics during the turmoil. 
The focus is on the existence and the functioning of “interbank customer relationships”. The 
literature uses the terms “lending relationship,” “relationship banking” or “customer relationship” to 
describe the stable (over time) and strong (quantitatively relevant) relationship that typically arises 
between banks (lenders) and non financial firms (borrowers). When, as in this study, both lenders 
and borrowers are banks, then customer relationships are “interbank”. The literature on bank firm 
relationships underscores that customer relationships benefit both parties: the lender gets borrower 
specific, often proprietary information in order to perform screening and monitoring functions and 
overcome problems of information asymmetry; the borrower may obtain lower funding cost and 
greater availability of credit.
2 In particular, since the durable relationship allows for better prediction 
of  when  borrowers  will  bounce  back  and  accommodates  inter temporal  smoothing  of  lenders’ 
income, this literature predicts that lenders will ensure the availability of credit to their long time 
customers when they are in difficulty (e.g. Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; Kashyap et al., 2002), or precisely in times of financial turmoil (De Mitri et al., 2010). This 
paper  analyses  exactly  whether,  just  as  in  bank firm  relationships,  the  frequent  and  repeated 
interactions of the interbank market originate special steady relationships among pairs of banks, and 
whether these “interbank customer relationships” benefit the borrowing banks, in particular those in 
difficulty during the crisis.  
                                                 
1 Email address: massimiliano.affinito@bancaditalia.it. This paper was written while I was a visiting scholar at the 
NBER, where I benefited from invaluable discussions and suggestions from James Poterba and participants at an NBER 
internal  meeting  (Boston,  May  2010).  I  would  also  like  to  thank  for  their  comments,  without  implicating  them  in 
responsibility, an anonymous referee, Ugo Albertazzi, Paolo Angelini, Francesco Columba, Riccardo De Bonis, Antonio 
Di Cesare, Fabio Farabullini, Mamiza Haq, Michele Manna, Gaetano Marseglia, Lars Norden, Matteo Piazza, Alberto 
Franco Pozzolo, and participants at the seminar held at the Bank of Italy (Rome, November 2010); at the “Systemic Risk, 
Basel  III,  Financial  Stability  and  Regulation  Conference”  (Sydney,  June  2011);  at  the  IFABS 2011  Conference  on 
“Financial Intermediation, Competition and Risk” (Rome, July 2011); at the 38th Annual Meeting of the European 
Finance Association (Stockholm, August 2011). The opinions expressed are only mine and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Bank of Italy or the NBER. 
2 See Lummer and McConnell (1989); Diamond (1991); Rajan (1992); Berglöf and von Thadden (1994); Boot and 
Thakor (1994); Petersen and Rajan (1995); Berlin and Mester (1999); Boot (2000).   6
The hypothesis of “interbank customer relationships” is not new, but the novelty of this paper 
is the fact that, for the first time to my knowledge, I explicitly and empirically test their existence 
and persistence, and verify their impact during a crisis. For example, Ferri and Marullo Reedtz 
(1989), analyzing the Italian interbank market in the Eighties, already use the expression interbank 
customer relationships, but verify neither their existence nor their effects. Furfine (2001) analyses 
the effects of interbank customer relationships (measured by different indexes) on the U.S. interbank 
interest rates, but he assumes but does not demonstrate their existence. Cocco et al. (2009) step 
forward.  Not  only  they  estimate  the  effect  of  interbank  customer  relationships on  the interbank 
interest  rates,  but  even  include  in  their  analysis  some  determinants  of  interbank  customer 
relationships. However, they use a considerably smaller number of explanatory variables, and do not 
explicitly test whether interbank customer relationships exist and persist; neither, of course, they 
analyze the effects of a financial crisis on interbank customer relationships because their sample 
covers the Portuguese interbank market between 1997 and 2001. Afonso et al. (2010) underscore 
that “it is important to investigate the role that banking relationships and repeat interactions in the 
fed funds market can play in improved monitoring of counterparty risks or as a vehicle to provide 
coinsurance of liquidity needs”, but leave this issue as agenda for future research. 
In this respect, Italy is an interesting case to study for three main reasons. First, it is a bank 
based economy so that, if interbank customer relationships exist, they are likely to matter. Second, 
since “the Italian banking system has weathered the crisis better than many others” (Draghi, 2009), it 
is  particularly  interesting  to  analyze  possible  reasons  of  this  resilience.  Third,  data  supervisory 
reporting  requirements in  Italy allow one  to know  the bilateral  amounts  and  identities  of  every 
interbank borrower and lender. 
My empirical analysis uses nearly 450,000 monthly observations from June 1998 to April 
2009. It is a three step process. I first verify the existence of stable interbank customer relationships 
by the criteria of length and continuity, running a duration model as in Ongena and Smith (2001); 
then examine the determinants of strong interbank customer relationships, i.e. the characteristics of 
the banks that rely more on interbank relationships both as borrowers and as lenders; and lastly study 
the functioning of interbank customer relationships during the 2007 2009 phase of the crisis. The 
findings have significant economic and policy implications: interbank customer relationships exist 
and persist over time; and they enable banks not to lose mutual trust, so that the healthier banks can 
provide much need funds to those more severely affected by the crisis.    7
My  paper  is  related  to  various  fields  of  research.  One  is  the  literature  on  bank firm 
relationships. Despite the evident differences between firm bank and bank bank partnerships, I apply 
some concepts and methodologies developed for the former to the interbank market.  
Second, my paper is related to the literature on market discipline in banking, according to 
which  if  banks  carry  out  peer  monitoring,  regulators  can  use  banks’  signals  to  identify  risky 
intermediaries. It is to highlight that, although these concepts were already present in Goodfriend and 
King (1988), Kaufman (1991), Berger (1991) and Schwartz (1992), who pointed out that banks are 
the best informed parties to judge the solvency of illiquid banks, the views set forth in this literature 
are  still  contrasting.  On  the  one  hand,  some  authors  –  Bhattacharya  and  Gale  (1987),  Flannery 
(1996), Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000), Freixas and Jorge (2007) Allen et al. (2008) – 
signal that banks should not be able to monitor their peers because interbank markets, like other 
credit  markets,  are  characterized  by  moral  hazard  and  asymmetric  information.  Likewise, 
Goodfriend (2002) and Martin and McAndrews (2007) claim that banks are not apt to monitor other 
banks, because the implicit guarantee supplied by central banks, which are expected to intervene in 
case of crisis, undermines banks’ incentives to monitor their peers. On the other hand, Rochet and 
Tirole (1996) demonstrate that interbank exposures might generate incentives for lending banks to 
monitor borrowing banks, even if this disciplinary role is relatively ineffective because interbank 
exposures  can  be  quickly  abandoned  owing  to  their  typically  short term  maturity.  Much  more, 
Calomiris  (1998)  stresses  that  banks  may  serve  as  monitors  of  other  banks  because  kindred 
institutions are best able to identify a peer’s risk. DeYoung et al. (1998), Peek et al. (1999), Berger 
et al. (2000), and Furfine (2002) also admit that banks possess knowledge regarding other bank’s 
health, even while highlighting that this is only complementary to the knowledge of central banks. In 
empirical analysis, admittedly still scarce, the hypothesis of peer monitoring prevails. Furfine (2001) 
documents that interbank interest rates in the U.S. federal funds market reflect in part the credit risk 
of the borrowing banks. Ashcraft and Bleakley (2006) find evidence, though weak, of the existence 
of market discipline. King (2008) demonstrates that high risk banks pay more than safe banks for 
interbank loans. Dinger and von Hagen (2009) show that in systems characterized by longer term 
interbank exposures the monitoring role of lenders is more important. My paper contributes to this 
literature by showing that banks maintain long term relationships and base these relationships on 
mutual monitoring. And the results suggest that stable interbank customer relationships, and the 
related peer monitoring, are helpful to macro regulators in avoiding failures in liquidity reallocation.    8
Third, the paper relates to the growing literature on the impact of the crisis on the functioning 
of  financial  markets,  and  specifically  on  the  interbank  market.
3  In  particular,  my  analysis 
complements those of Cassola et al. (2008); Angelini et al. (2011); and Afonso et al. (2010). Cassola 
et al. (2008) note that the crisis exacerbated cross country asymmetric information problems and 
caused  a  decline  in  cross border  transactions;  consistently,  I  show  that,  unlike  cross country 
transactions, the Italian domestic interbank market did not experience such a deterioration. Angelini 
et al. (2011) also analyse the Italian interbank market before and after crisis. Although their focus is 
different,  as  they  study  the  determinants  of  the  interbank  interest  rate  spread,  my  findings  are 
consistent with their main conclusion. They find that the widening interbank spread was not due to 
bank specific factors but to increasing aggregate risk aversion; accordingly, my paper shows that, 
during  the  crisis,  interbank  customer  relationships  seemed  to  work  well  and  bank specific 
characteristics, even when deteriorated, did not hamper interbank transactions. Afonso et al. (2010) 
examine the impact of the financial crisis on the U.S. interbank market. They find that, in the days 
immediately after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, borrowing bank specific characteristics become 
more important in driving the lending banks’ decisions, entailing an increased differentiation on the 
federal funds market between borrowing banks of high versus low type, not only on the amounts lent 
but even in the cost of funds. They also show that the return to the pre crisis levels occurs as the 
effect of the government support for systematically important banks. By contrast, my analysis shows 
that Italian inter group domestic interbank exposures did not decrease after the onset of the crisis, 
one reason being the presence of interbank customer relationships. This contributes also to explain 
why government intervention in Italy has been negligible in comparison to other countries (Panetta 
et al., 2009). Moreover, Afonso et al. do not find in the U.S. market a relationship between lending 
banks’ characteristics and amounts lent, while I show that after the crisis in Italy just the healthier 
banks are willing to be substantial lenders in the interbank customer relationships.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three steps of my 
analysis. Section 3 presents my data on dependent variables and on covariates. Section 4 reports the 
results, Section 5 summarizes robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
3 See Dudley (2008); Cassola et al. (2008); Gynetelberg and Wooldridge (2008); Michaud and Upper (2008); Angelini et 
al. (2011); Taylor and Williams (2009); Heider et al. (2009); Porzio et al. (2009); Afonso et al. (2010).   9
2. Empirical strategy 
My empirical analysis is divided into three steps. The first examines stability over time and 
the second the quantitative strength of interbank customer relationships, although the two concepts 
of stability and strength are constantly intermingled in both stages of analysis. The third step is the 
inquiry into what happened during the recent financial crisis.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, in my first step, I estimate a duration model following 
Ongena and Smith (2001). Duration models are typically used in labour economics to estimate, say, 
duration of unemployment; they are used by Ongena and Smith (2001) to estimate the duration of 
firm bank relationships; and by me to estimate the duration of bank bank relationships. 
These models analyse the span of time that passes from a beginning condition (initial state) to 
the occurrence of a certain random event (switch). In my case, the initial state starts when a bank for 
the first time lends to − or borrows from − another bank (that is, when an interbank relationship 
between a pair of banks is established); and the switch occurs when the interbank exposure dries up 
(that is, when the interbank relationship ends or breaks even only for one period).
4 
In particular, these models allow one to estimate the presence of positive or negative duration 
dependence. Duration dependence is said to be positive when the probability that a switch from the 
initial state occurs increases as the time span lengthens; negative when that probability decreases and 
the initial state accordingly proves to be stable. Ongena and Smith (2001) find positive duration 
dependence in relationships between firms and banks in Norway − firms are more likely to leave a 
bank as the span increases − and therefore conclude that the value of the firm bank relationship 
declines over time. I utilize the same methodology and the same argument but find negative duration 
dependence, i.e. that the probability of ending or breaking an interbank relationship decreases over 
time. I accordingly conclude that stable interbank relationships exist. 
The  presence  of  positive  or  negative  duration  dependence  is  estimated  through  a  hazard 
function λ(t). The hazard function provides a suitable method for summarising the relation between 
span length and the likelihood of switching because it determines the probability that a switch will 
occur, conditional on the span surviving through time t. When λ(t) is increasing (decreasing) in t, the 
hazard function exhibits positive (negative) duration dependence; when λ(t) is constant in t, there is 
constant duration dependence and thus no correlation between span and switch. 
                                                 
4 Relationships which began prior to my sample period are left censored; relationships continuing after my sample 
period are right censored. Different methods exist to allow for left  and right  censoring. I use them as robustness checks 
in Section 5.    10
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where ts is the time when a switch from the initial state of interbank relationship occurs; Ts is the 
span that passes before the switch occurs; λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function that describes the 
probability  of  leaving  the  initial  state  of  relationship  for  hypothetical  banks  with  no  set  of 
characteristics, which serve as a reference group. The duration model also allows one to infer the 
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i,j,t, where α, β, and γ are vectors of coefficients. Each coefficient 
therefore measures the proportional change in the hazard rate that can be attributed to an absolute 
change in the regressors. Finally, k
l, k
b, and k
lb indicate the different number of regressors in each 
matrix. 
Computationally,  it  is  standard  to  adopt  the  Weibull  model  as  a  functional  form  of  the 
baseline hazard λ0(t).
5 It states that: 
 
λ0(t) = θ φ t 
φ−1                                                                                                                                 (1.2) 
 
where θ > 0 and φ > 0 are unknown parameters. On the basis of estimations: when φ = 1, the 
distribution exhibits constant duration dependence; when φ > 1, positive duration dependence; and 
when φ < 1, negative duration dependence.  
Once the existence of stable relationships has been investigated, the second step analyses the 
determinants  of  strong  relationships.  To  this  end,  preliminarily,  I  measure  the  strength  of  each 
lending and borrowing relationship through two indexes. The first is computed as the ratio between 
the  total  funds  that  i  lends  to  j  (
j i L
® )  and  the  total  funds  that  i  lends  in  the  interbank  market 
                                                 




® ∑ ), which gauges whether j is a substantial interbank borrower of i (substantial borrower 
index, hereafter SBI): 
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where i, j = 1, 2, …, Nt indicate all pairs of banks i ≠ j ; and t = 1, 2, …, T are the time periods. The 
subscript t in Nt indicates that the number of banks operating in the interbank market and the number 
of counterparties change over time and across banks. 
The second index is computed as the ratio between the total funds that i borrows from j 
(
j i B
¬ ) and the total funds that i borrows in the interbank market (
t N i
B
¬ ∑ ), and gauges whether j is 
a substantial interbank lender of i (substantial lender index, hereafter SLI): 
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The higher the two indexes, the closer the interbank customer relationship. As a check, I also 
construct alternative measures of the two indexes based on the number of interbank relationships 
rather than on transacted quantities.
6 
Next  I  analyse  the  determinants  of  these  indexes;  that  is,  I  try  to  detect  the  banking 
characteristics that strengthen interbank relationships. Again, as in equation (1.1), I investigate the 
determinants of my indexes using as regressors both lender side and borrower side characteristics 
along with variables measuring the interactions between lenders and borrowers. In formal terms, I 











i,j,t + ηi, t                         (2.3) 
 
                                                 
6 Thus, I calculate the relationship between i and j as one to the number of banks that i lent to (or borrowed from) during 
each period. My indexes are similar to those computed by Furfine (2001); Cocco et al. (2009); and in general to those 
extensively utilized in the literature on bank firm customer relationships (e.g. Elsas, 2005).    12










i,j,t are defined as in equation (1.1), and ηi, t is the idiosyncratic error ~ i.i.d. 
(0, 
2
h s ). Since my indexes capture the cross sectional and the longitudinal dimension of interbank 
customer relationships, the second step uses the panel estimation as a basic regression model. 
The third step investigates both the effects of the crisis on interbank customer relationships 
and  the  way  in  which  interbank  customer  relationships  affect  the  consequences  of  the  crisis, 
repeating the exercises of the two previous steps after splitting the entire sample period into two time 
spans, before and after the crisis. 
3. Data 
3.1 Key variables: duration and strength of interbank relationships 
In the first step, the key variable is the duration of each interbank relationship. In the second 
step,  the  dependent  variables  are  the  indexes  SBI  and  SLI,  computed  first  on  the  quantities  of 
interbank exposures in the basic estimations, and then, as a check, on the number of counterparties. 
In the third step, all the key variables are used. Table 1 reports their summary statistics. Table 2 
shows the relations among them, when computed as averages, first by each bank, and then across 
banks and over time. 
All the key variables are computed on monthly Italian bank by bank data, drawn from the 
Bank  of  Italy’s  prudential  supervisory  reports.  The  Bank  of  Italy  collects  information  on  gross 
bilateral  interbank  exposures  (assets  and  liabilities  of  each  bank),  and  the  identity  of  every 
counterparty. My sample covers monthly data from June 1998 to April 2009, so the number of time 
periods is: ti = 1, 2, …, Ti, where Ti = 131 if the bank is always present in the interbank market. 
Since in Italy all banks, including branches of foreign banks, must report to the Bank of Italy, my 
data refer to all banks operating in Italy. The number of banks i = 1, 2, …, Nt varies in each t from 
833 in June 1998 to 771 in April 2009. The number of counterparties ci,t = 1, 2, …, Ci,t varies across 
banks and over time. The final number of observations is TiNtCi,t = 460,964. 
Three aspects deserve emphasis. First, I focus on quantity measures of interbank customer 
relationships. This choice is not unusual. Emphasis on the quantity dimension has been growing in 
the literature on interbank markets (e.g. Furfine, 2004 and 2009; King, 2008; Dinger and von Hagen, 
2009;  Cocco  et  al.,  2009)  and  is  common  in  the  related  literature  on  firm bank  relationships.   13
Moreover, it allows me to analyse all Italian interbank exposures, including over the counter ones 
for which interest rate data are not available. 
Second, although interbank activity is usually at very short maturities, I use end of month 
stocks for my dependent variables, because data on quantities are not available on a more frequent 
basis. For example, Cocco et al. (2009) and Angelini et al. (2011) utilize daily data for interest rates, 
but quarterly or yearly data for their regressors; King (2008) uses only quarterly data; and Dinger 
and von Hagen (2009) only yearly data. 
Third, my key variables are computed on the component of interbank transactions carried out 
domestically  by  banks  belonging  to  different  banking  groups  (inter group  exposures).  In  other 
words,  I  dropped  the  data  on  non domestic  and  intra group  transactions.  The  non domestic 
exposures are removed simply because, although the Bank of Italy’s database allows one to obtain 
the stock of interbank exposures from and to abroad, I could not determine the characteristics of 
foreign  counterparties  as  regressors.  The  intra group  (or  internal  capital  market)  exposures  are 
removed because these transactions fit into a group specific scheme, are likely to be decided by the 
parent bank, and are affected by group task sharing (e.g. Houston et al., 1997; de Haas and van 
Lelyveld, 2010). In any case, although intra group and cross country transactions were eliminated 
from the key variables, I retained them as two explanatory variables. 
In order to eliminate the intra group exposures, I used information on the identity of each 
counterparty and its group. For the banks that changed group during my sample period I traced the 
current group of affiliation in each ti, and analyzed their effective inter group relationships in each 
period. To exemplify how I computed the span Ts in these cases, let us assume three banks initially 
belonging to two banking groups: a to group A; b and c to B. Let us assume also that the three banks 
maintain always mutual interbank exposures, and at ts c is acquired by group A. Before ts, I exclude 
the transactions between b and c as intra group. After ts, my counting: (i) continues unchanged for 
the relationships between a and b because the two banks were and remain in different groups; (ii) 
ends for a and c because their mutual exposures become intra group; (iii) starts for the first time for 
the transactions between b and c because their relationship becomes inter group. 
My approach works well even when an interbank relationship ends because one of the two 
involved banks leaves the market as a consequence of a merger. In fact, in such circumstances in the 
abstract  there  may  be  a  (disputable)  measurement  error,  but  in  practice  in  my  sample  it  is 
unimportant.  To  clarify  this  point,  let  assume  again  three  banks:  x  and  y  have  an  interbank 
relationship before ts, and x leaves at ts because it merges with z. At ts, my counting of duration of the   14
relationship between x and y obviously ceases. Also at ts, for y and z there are four hypothetical 
cases: y and z (i) continue to have no relationship; (ii) continue a previous relationship; (iii) cease 
their relationship; (iv) establish a relationship. In the first three cases, my counting of duration does 
not present problems. Only in the last case, the relationship between y and z might possibly derive 
from the past relationship between x and y, whereas I begin a new count . However, in practice such 
situations are negligible in my sample.
7 
Figures 1 and 2 plot outstanding amounts and percentage shares of total assets of four kinds 
of interbank exposures: total, non domestic, intra group and inter group. The figures show that, apart 
from non domestic exposures (Cassola et al., 2008; Heider et al., 2009), the amounts of Italian 
interbank domestic exposures have not fallen since the onset of the crisis. The figures also show that 
inter group activity accounts for a relatively small share of total transactions among banks, while an 
increasing majority is accounted for by the internal capital market. Therefore, my approach serves to 
remove a large quantity of misleading and noisy information.  
An  examination  of  my descriptive  statistics serves  mainly to  confirm  the need  for  more 
sophisticated statistical tools. The average duration of an interbank relationship is 28 consecutive 
months, when the average is computed on the ongoing duration in each period; it lengthens to 47 
consecutive months, when the average is computed on the final duration of all relationships; and to 
96, when the average is computed on the final duration of the longest relationships of each bank 
(Table 1). The average number of borrowers is 5 and the average number of lenders 8. The greater 
concentration of the borrowing side is confirmed by the average value of SBI, equal to 0.19, which is 
higher  than  the  average  value  of  SLI,  0.13.  In  general,  longer  relationships  are  associated  with 
stronger relationships and fewer counterparties (Table 2). However, there is no lack of non linear 
effects.  The  hypothesis  of  the  existence  and  strengthening  over  time  of  interbank  customer 
relationships seems to be supported by the fact that the average values of SLI and SBI are increasing 
(Figure 3), and the number of counterparties is decreasing (Figure 4). On the other hand, these 
average developments may simply derive from the general process of banking concentration. Figure 
5 plots different specifications of the final duration of interbank relationships, both in terms of the 
                                                 
7 There is a second − not less relevant − reason why my approach works well even in the case of point (iv). For 
completeness  on  this  issue,  it  is  useful  to  deal  with  this  second  reason here,  even  if  I  have  not  yet  described  my 
estimations in detail. The case of point (iv) represents a (potential) measurement error. The only possible effect of this 
error would be to underestimate the length of span Ts. However, since in my estimations I find that relationships are long 
and stable, my outcomes would have been even stronger without this error. Furthermore, I also checked this issue 
empirically in my regressions, adding a dummy variable for bank mergers. The dummy had no impact on the likelihood 
of terminating an interbank relationship or on the other regressors.    15
number of months and as a percentage of the effective presence in the interbank market. If one refers 
to the longest interbank relationship of each bank, about 70 per cent of banks and 80 per cent of the 
interbank market maintain at least one very long lasting relationship (at least 81 consecutive months 
or more than 80 per cent of the periods of interbank activity). On the other hand, if one refers to the 
average duration of all relationships, the distribution is much more uniform.  
3.2. Explanatory variables and expected signs 
Table 3 lists my explanatory variables, tells how they are calculated, and gives their summary 
statistics. All regressors are dummy variables, ratios or natural logarithms.







i,j,t of equations (1.1) and (2.3) depending on whether they refer to 
borrowers, lenders or both. The covariates may be classified in six groups on the basis of the effect 
they proxy (Table 4).  
The first variable, Relationship Duration, is similar to the key variable in the first step of the 
analysis (Ts in equation 1.1), and thus is used as a regressor only in the second and third steps.
9 In 
fact, in addition to being the object of the analysis in the first step, the duration of a relationship may 
affect its strength. In particular, its expected sign is positive if interbank customer relationships 
persist  over  time  and  their  length  positively  affects  their  strength  (as  this  relates  to  bank firm 
relationship, see Petersan and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995).
10 
The second group of regressors includes seven borrower specific variables, which are related 
to agency problems (Table 4, second column, upper panel): Size, Capital, Bad Loans, Structure of 
Income/Opacity, ROE, Rating, and Banks without Rating. The expected sign of these variables is ex 
ante ambiguous. On the one hand, if a regressor signals higher asymmetric information, the expected 
effect on my dependent variables is negative. On the other hand, as is argued in the literature on 
                                                 
8 Estimations of the three steps of my analysis are carried out using banks’ previous quarter balance sheet items to 
resolve possible endogeneity problems and to replicate the publication delay needed for banks to assess one another.  
9 As a robustness check, Relationship Duration is computed in three alternative ways. First, in the basic estimations, it 
counts in each period the integer number of consecutive months elapsed in my sample since the start of an interbank 
relationship between each pair of banks. Equivalently to Ts, the counting starts over whenever a relationship resumes 
after a break of any length, even one month. Second, to control for the size of the exposures, I recalculated the variable 
removing the smallest relationships, i.e. those below either the 10
th or 25
th distribution percentile of SBI and SLI. Third, 
to control for the effective period of activity of each bank, I computed the variable as a ratio between the number of 
consecutive months and the total number of months in which the bank is active in the interbank market, such that the 
variable continues to assume increasing values but weighted for the effective period of activity. In the first definition of 
the variable, the values and number of observations of Relationship Duration and the spans Ts are partially different 
(Tables 1 3). This is because Ts excludes one period relationships, while Relationship Duration counts them as lasting 
one month. 
10 As detailed in Section 4, the signs of coefficients have an opposite interpretation in my first and second steps of 
analysis. In particular, in a partially counterintuitive way, the hazard rate estimation predicts that negative coefficients of 
covariates indicate a longer duration. In this section, I comment on the expected signs in the “intuitive” way.    16
relationships between banks and non financial corporations, customer relationships can overcome 
agency problems, so borrowers may be financed mainly when troubled in the short term and the 
effect  of  testable  indicators  may  turn  out  to  be  inverted  (e.g.  Chemmanur  and  Fulghieri,  1994; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berlin and Mester, 1999; Kashyap et al., 2002).
11 
Two regressors in this group measure the role of rating agencies. “Rating” is coded so as to 
take values from 1 to 11, where 1 corresponds to the best rating class and 10 to the worst, with 11 
assigned to banks with no rating. At the same time, following Angelini et al. (2011), I use a dummy 
variable, “Banks without Rating,” that takes the value of 1 for banks with no rating and 0 otherwise. 
In the estimations, I use four different kinds of credit scores taken from the agency Fitch through the 
database  of  Bloomberg.
12  Being  an  inverse  measure,  the  expected  sign  of  borrowers’  Rating  is 
negative if lending banks trust credit rating agencies and use them to value the creditworthiness of 
borrowing banks; it is positive (or possibly insignificant) if lending banks distrust rating agencies or 
if interbank customer relationships render their judgement pointless. The prediction of the dummy 
Banks without Rating is equally uncertain (see Morgan, 2002; Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran, 
2004). 
The seven regressors of the third group of variables are equivalent to the previous ones, but 
are referred to lenders instead of borrowers. In this case, they do not measure agency problems, but 
the lending capacity of banks. Their predictions are equally open. For example, lenders’ Capital and 
ROE are positive if only well capitalized and profitable banks are lenders in the interbank market but 
negative if well capitalized and profitable banks are more active outside than inside the interbank 
market.  
The fourth group of regressors concerns three variables related to borrowers’ and lenders’ 
liquidity situation. Fund Raising measures the level of liquidity of each bank; Volatility of Liquidity 
measures  the  related  degree  of  volatility;  and,  following  Cocco  et  al.  (2009),  Liquidity  Shocks 
                                                 
11 “Size” is particularly interesting in this field of research because of the classical “too big to fail” argument, according 
to which its effect should be positive as larger banks are more likely to obtain interbank loans because they should not go 
bankrupt. Moreover, larger firms are typically considered less opaque and thus more creditworthy. On the other hand, the 
effect might be the opposite because: (i) at least in the wake of the financial turmoil, the Lehman Brothers’ failure could 
have reversed the traditional “too big to fail” argument or made it harder to determine who is “too big”; (ii) larger banks 
might demand less interbank funding, as they can count upon other sources. The name “Structure of Income/Opacity” 
derives  from the  fact that this variable is often  used as a proxy of asymmetric information  because fee generating 
activities are considered less easy to read by other agents compared to interest generating activities. 
12 Angelini et al. (2011) find that Fitch ratings are more informative in the assessment of banks and financial firms. All 
the credit ratings are obtained as a monthly average of ratings available daily. My first choice is the overall individual 
rating; the other three types of credit rating are: support, long term and short term issuer default rating. Again following 
Angelini et al. (2011), I assign the rating of the controlling company to banks that do not have their own rating but 
belong to groups with rated banks. However, as a check I remove this hypothesis.    17
Correlation  measures  the  correlation  between  the  liquidity  shocks  of  each  pair  of  banks.  The 
predictions are again open. For example, the higher Fund Raising is, the less likely a bank should be 
to request funds from other banks, and the more likely it should be to offer funds. However, the sign 
might be opposite if, for example, highly liquid banks choose more remunerative investments than 
interbank lending.  
The fifth group of variables includes five covariates that proxy the use banks make of their 
liquidity. Three regressors refer to both borrowers and lenders: Total Loans, Non Domestic Assets, 
and  Total  Shares.  Two  are  calculated  only  for  borrowers:  Intra group  Interbank  Net  Position 
measures the net position of each bank inside its banking group (the internal capital market); Non 
Domestic Interbank Net Position measures the external net position of each bank. The expected sign 
of these variables depends on the relative importance of each kind of business. 
The  last  category  of  regressors  comprises  two  variables  called  “Securities  Interaction”, 
standing for the securities issued by the borrower and held by the lender or vice versa. These are 
proxies of the interactions between borrowers and lenders outside the interbank market, the idea 
being that, as in bank firm relationships, the information that banks obtain by offering multiple 
services may be of value in lending (e.g. Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). The expected sign is 
therefore positive. 
4. Results 
4.1. First step: stability and existence  
The results of the first step are reported in Table 5, which presents seven specifications, 
variously mixing the explanatory variables. Specification (1) is empty of regressors, and the focus is 
only on the value of the parameter φ of equation (1.2); Specification (6) includes bank by bank 
dummies  and  the  full  range  of  regressors  presented  in  Table  4;  Specification  (7)  includes  as 
regressors also the number of bank counterparties.  
The first relevant outcome is that the parameter φ is always significantly less than one, even 
when,  as  expected,  it  increases  slightly  owing  to  the  addition  of  the  explanatory  variables.
13 
                                                 
13 Besides permitting the estimation of the determinants of duration, the inclusion of regressors serves to control for 
heterogeneity  across  observations,  and  according  to  Heckman  and  Singer  (1984)  and  Ongena  and  Smith  (2001)  it 
eliminates possible biases in the outcomes of the parameter φ. In this light, I also ran regressions with and without a time 
dummy to allow for macroeconomic trends and in particular for the monetary policy stance (Affinito and Farabullini, 
2009).   18
Therefore, interbank customer relationships exhibit negative duration dependence: they exist and are 
stable, because the probability of their ending or breaking off decreases over time.  
The second lesson of this first step concerns the factors driving the probability of ending an 
interbank relationship. On the borrower side, the duration of interbank relationships is longer: first, if 
borrowers  are  well capitalized  and  profitable  (borrowers’  variables  Capital  and  ROE  are 
significantly negative); second, if their business focuses more on fee generating services than on 
interest generating activities (Structure of Income/Opacity is significantly negative); third, if they are 
either non rated or well rated; fourth, if they are net lenders inside their domestic banking group or 
abroad  (Intra group  Interbank  Net  Position  and  Non Domestic  Interbank  Net  Position  are 
significantly negative); and finally if their lending activity is florid (Total Loans is significantly 
negative). On the contrary, the probability of ending an interbank relationship earlier increases if 
borrowers  are  large  (Size  is  significantly  positive)  and  if  their  liquidity  is  high  in  amount  and 
volatility. 
On  the  lender  side,  the  duration  of  interbank  relationships  is  longer  if  lenders  are  well 
capitalized, profitable, and liquid. But duration shortens if lenders are large, burdened with non 
performing loans, unrated, liquidity volatile, or with investment directed to other business (Total 
Loans and Total Shares are significantly positive). 
On the interaction side, the duration of interbank relationships increases if borrowers and 
lenders  interact  outside  the  interbank  market.  In  Specification  (7),  I  included  as  regressors  the 
number of  lenders (lending  to borrowers) as well as the number of  borrowers (borrowing from 
lenders). The sign of both regressors is significantly negative. This means that the probability of 
prolonging one’s own interbank relationships increases with the number of counterparties. 
All the specifications indicate that interbank relationships are long. During my sample period 
of  131  months,  they  lasted  on  average  for  70  and  108  consecutive  months,  respectively,  using 
Specification  (7)  and  (1),  and  the  average  values  of  the  explanatory  variables.  The  duration  of 
relationships  among  banks  appears  to  be  particularly  long  in  view  of  the  typically  very  short 
maturities of interbank exposures. To verify the robustness of this estimate, I repeated the first step 
after removing the small relationships, as one could conjecture that duration dependence may change 
with size of exposure. In an extreme case, banks might maintain some stable relationships but based 
on small quantities, while doing most of their interbank transactions with rotating counterparties. To 
control  for  this,  I  removed  alternatively  the  exposures  under  the  10
th,  25
th  and  50
th  distribution 
percentile of SBI and SLI defined in equations (2.1) and (2.2). In all cases, φ always remained   19
significantly  less  than  one.  The  estimate  of  the  duration  diminished  but  never  fell  below  60 
consecutive months.  
Using  Specifications  (6)  and  (7),  I  also  quantified  the  estimated  effect  of  the  different 
regressors on the expected duration of interbank relationships. The last columns of Table 5 report the 
change of duration in months when shifting from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of the distribution of 
each regressor. For example, moving from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of borrowers’ Fund Raising, 
namely  comparing  two  borrowers,  one  illiquid  and  the  other  liquid,  the  duration  of  interbank 
relationships decreases by 97 periods according to Specification (6) and by 66 according to (7). The 
other  economically  significant  factors  in  lengthening  duration  are: both lenders’  and borrowers’ 
Total Loans; lenders’ Fund Raising; and borrowers’ rating and credit scores. Interestingly, a crucial 
lengthening role is also played by borrowers’ Non Domestic Interbank Net Position: transferring 
funds abroad does not diminish but actually extends the duration of interbank customer relationships.  
4.2. Second step: strength and determinants  
Table 6 reports the results of the second step for eight specifications, containing the same 
covariates for both SLI and SBI.
14 Other estimations are described in the next Section as robustness 
checks. As is clear in Table 6, and as I explain in this and in the next Section, the results are robust.
15  
The same variables, both on the borrowers’ and the lenders’ side, often have different signs 
in the estimations of the SLI and SBI. This depends on the different role played by banks, on the one 
hand, as “substantial lenders” or “substantial borrowers”, and, on the other hand, as “lenders of 
substantial borrowers” and “borrowers of substantial lenders”.
16  
                                                 
14 As mentioned, in the second step I use panel estimation as a basic model. It is worthwhile clarifying four aspects. First, 
I ran both fixed effects and random effects models. Results remained stable, in part because my T is large enough. I 
present results of the fixed effects because the individual effects and the explanatory variables are likely to be correlated, 
as signalled by the Hausman test. Second, I attempted to cluster both at the borrower and at the lender level. In the 
specifications displayed, the fixed effects capture the borrowers in the SBI and the lenders in the SLI, as they are the 
object of the selection process in each respective equation. However, results were stable after switching the individual 
effects, because I added counterparty dummies consistently with the relevant literature and in line with the presence of 
the counterparty’s characteristics among regressors. Third, as in the first step, I ran regressions with and without a time 
dummy. Fourth, I adopted the fixed effects adjusting the standard errors for general forms of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Arellano, 1987).  
15 Very few regressors appear less stable: 5 out of 68 total regressors. In Section 5, I discuss the reasons of this minor 
stability. Coherently with the first step, I also ran regressions including as regressors the numbers of counterparties. 
Although the results were confirmed, I decided not to use those estimations in the second step because (i) my dependent 
variables already discount the number of counterparties; and (ii) the inverses of the number of counterparties are used as 
alternative dependent variables in unreported but consistent estimations. 
16 The different effect determined by the same variables in the asset and in the liability side is typical of the literature on 
interbank markets. The use of the same regressors in the estimations of the two indexes allows me to detect some 
interesting, sometimes uneven and sometimes mirrored, results. For example, the variable Size presents uneven results. 
In the SLI, substantial lenders of small borrowers tend to be large banks (the signs of variable Size are negative for   20
The first variable, Relationship Duration, which is always significantly positive, confirms the 
persistence of interbank relationships found in the first step and signals that the longer a relationship 
is, the more likely it is to be strong. 
Taken  together,  the  regressors  associated  with  borrowers’  agency  problems  show  that 
although interbank customer relationships exist and persist, monitoring activity on borrowing banks 
seems  to  remain  necessary.  As  mentioned,  ex ante  one  might  reasonably  argue  that  repeated 
interbank transactions would allow banks to assess one another and create mutual trust regardless of 
the short term conditions. But my outcomes show that interbank customer relationships are based on 
the observable  characteristics of  borrowers.  In  fact,  according to  the  SBI estimation,  substantial 
borrowers tend to be chosen if they have larger Size, greater Capital and less Bad Loans.
17  
The regressors that proxy lending capacity show that substantial lenders have larger Size, 
lower Capital and a heavier burden of Bad Loans. This seems to suggest that poorly capitalized 
banks are more likely to be substantial interbank lenders because they are less likely to invest outside 
the interbank market. As a consequence, they have more bad loans, because they are less accustomed 
to or less skilled at monitoring the creditworthiness of their non bank customers; yet they are unrated 
or well rated (lenders’ Banks without Rating is positive and Rating is negative), because they are 
likely to assume less risk outside the interbank market.  
As far as liquidity is concerned, substantial borrowers tend to be those with sizeable liquidity 
needs due to both low Fund Raising and high Volatility of Liquidity. On the other hand, banks with 
high Fund Raising are not substantial lenders, as one might expect, confirming that these banks are 
more  likely  to  search  for  more  profitable  investments  outside  the  interbank  market.  However, 
substantial lenders do tend to have low Volatility of Liquidity. The picture remains consistent also as 
regards  Liquidity  Shocks  Correlation.  Borrowers  tend  to  rely  on  substantial  lenders  with  low 
Volatility of Liquidity and hence do not worry about Liquidity Shocks Correlation, which turns out 
to be positive (SLI estimation). In contrast, lenders tend to select substantial borrowers with high 
Volatility of Liquidity, provided that Liquidity Shocks Correlation is negative (SBI estimation). 
The  regressors  linked  to  liquidity  motivations  confirm  that  when  banks  are  substantial 
lenders, they are less involved in other kinds of businesses (in SLI, lenders’ Total Loans, Non 
                                                                                                                                                                    
borrowers and positive for lenders). In the SBI, substantial borrowers of small lenders tend to be large banks. This result 
is typical and is also due to the fact that larger banks weight more on the balance sheets of their counterparties. An 
example of mirrored result is represented by the variable Bad Loans. When substantial lenders have high Bad Loans, so 
have borrowers (SLI estimation); when the value of the ratio is small, it is small for both of them (SBI). 
17 The outcomes of the two borrower variables linked to rating agencies are described in the next sub section because the 
results of these two variables seem to depend on a different attitude of banks before and after the financial crisis.   21
domestic Assets, and Total Shares are negative). At the same time, substantial borrowers rely on 
interbank  relationships  to  finance  all  their  activities  (in  SBI,  the  three  borrowers’  variables  are 
positive). Moreover, the likelihood of being substantial borrowers increases when banks are net 
lenders  inside  a  domestic  group  or  abroad,  because  in  such  circumstances  banks  demand  a 
comparatively large amount of funds from every lender in order to set up a stable financing source 
for themselves, the whole group, and their foreign counterparties.
18  
Finally, the two symmetrical variables Securities’ Interaction usually have a positive and 
significant coefficient showing that interactions undertaken by banks outside the interbank market 
strengthen their relationship.
19  
4.3. Third step: During the crisis  
As explained in Section 2, in order to verify whether interbank customer relationships have 
continued to exist, and how they functioned during the crisis, I split my entire sample period into two 
spans, before and after August 2007, the consensus date for the onset of the crisis, and repeated the 
exercises of the previous two steps. 
The most significant conclusion is that interbank customer relationships survived the crisis. 
The parameter φ is always significantly less than one for equations (1.1) and (1.2) over the months 
following the onset of the crisis (not reported). Nevertheless, banking practices have changed and 
adapted, as is shown by the reshaping of coefficients in the estimation of equations (2.1) (2.3). Table 
7 reports the results of Specification (8), chosen because it contains the full range of my explanatory 
variables. The effect of Relationship Duration is very noticeably unmodified after the meltdown, 
signalling that the length of the relationship remains a crucial factor in explaining when a bank is a 
substantial lender or borrower. By contrast, the sign or the statistical significance of some relevant 
determinants are different before and after the crisis.  
First, after the crisis, substantial lenders are rated (in SLI, lenders’ dummy Banks without 
Rating is positive before the crisis and becomes negative after the crisis), and have worse ratings (the 
variable Rating becomes positive). However, they have higher capital, a higher level of liquidity, a 
larger amount of loans, and are less opaque. At the same time, borrowers of substantial lenders are 
                                                 
18 On the other hand, in the SLI both regressors are negative. This means that, when a bank is a net lender inside a 
domestic group or abroad, it does not select one particular lender because it is likely to request funds from many banks. 
19 Interestingly, however, the sign is negative in the SBI for securities held by borrowers and issued by lenders. This 
seems to corroborate the idea that substantial borrowers do not choose their lenders but are chosen by them.   22
financed even if, or mainly because, they are in trouble, having less capital, worse ratings, lower 
ROE, and fewer loans. Moreover, they are financed regardless of bad loans or of being rated.  
Second,  after  the  crisis,  substantial  borrowers  are  picked  out  if  they  have  easy to read 
balance sheets (in SBI, Structure of income/Opacity is insignificant before the crisis but becomes 
significant and negative after it) and higher profits, but with no regard for their rating, liquidity 
volatility and correlation. Moreover, the financing of substantial borrowers is unrelated or inversely 
related to the interactions outside the interbank market (in SBI, after the crisis, the two Securities’ 
Interaction variables become, respectively, insignificant and negative). At the same time, lenders of 
substantial borrowers provide liquidity even if they have less capital, and regardless of their bad 
loans,  structure  of  income,  rating  score,  amount  of  loans  and  shares  (these  variables  become 
insignificant). 
As noted in the previous Section, the results of borrowers’ rating and credit scores before and 
after the crisis are particularly interesting, and clarify the role of rating agencies in the selection of 
substantial borrowers. In fact, before the crisis, substantial borrowers were chosen either if they were 
unrated or, if rated, if they had good scores. On the contrary, after the crisis the presence of rating 
and credit scores become unimportant and substantial borrowers seem to be selected on the basis of a 
pure lender’s assessment.  
The marginal effects of the explanatory variables confirm this picture. Table 8 displays the 
percentage change that both indexes, SLI and SBI, undergo in moving from the 25
th to the 75
th 
distribution percentile of each regressor, before and after the crisis. In general, the main determinants 
are very similar to those concerning the duration of interbank relationships: Size, Fund Raising, 
Total Loans, rating, and credit scores. Like Furfine (2001), King (2008), and Angelini et al. (2011), I 
find that Capital and Bad Loans play a statistically significant yet economically modest role. Mainly, 
my results show that the length of relationships affects both SLI and SBI positively and powerfully, 
both before and after the crisis.  
The  marginal  effects  also  confirm  in  terms  of  economic  impact  that  after  the  crisis  the 
healthier banks are willing to be substantial lenders and that troubled banks are not deprived of 
interbank  financing.  These  outcomes  corroborate  the  general  predictions  of  the  literature  on 
customer relationships, while for example contradict the hypothesis of Acharya et al. (2008), who 
conjecture that it may be rational for banks with a liquidity surplus not to provide liquidity to needy 
banks, in hopes of picking up their assets at fire sale prices.   23
5. Robustness checks 
In addition to the checks described in the previous Sections,
20 I tested the robustness of my 
results in several additional ways.
21 
5.1 Left and right censoring 
Typical of this kind of analysis, my first step suffers from both left and right censoring, 
which may cause biased and inconsistent estimations (Heckman and Singer, 1984; Kiefer, 1988). 
Censoring arises because, in order to determine exactly when a relationship starts and ends, one must 
know  its  complete  history  (relationships  that  began  prior  to  the  dataset  are  left censored,  those 
continuing after the dataset are right censored). In this regard, the advantage of my dataset is its 
length and frequency; my results are confirmed when estimations are carried out over different sub 
sample periods; and right censoring should not jeopardize my findings because, on the contrary, it 
presumably increased rather than decreased φ in equation (1.2). Nonetheless, I again followed the 
strategy adopted by Ongena and Smith (2001), and added further checks, in order to assess the 
sensitivity of my outcomes to censoring. For left censoring I used two methods: (i) rerunning the 
regressions  on  a  large  number  of  hypothetical  new  starting  dates;  and  (ii)  eliminating  the  left 
censored observations. For right censoring, I used three methods: (i) expressing the log likelihood 
function as a weighted average of the sample density of completed duration spans and the survivor 
function of uncompleted spans; (ii) eliminating the right censored observations; and (iii) calculating 
the duration of each relationship by considering it either as ended or not after one month, two months 
or three months of interruption. In all cases, φ remained smaller than 1 both on my entire sample 
period and after the crisis. 
5.2 Different baseline hazard functions 
                                                 
20 In fact, although dispersedly, I have already noted that my outcomes are robust to the following checks: (i) the 
inclusion of a dummy variable assuming value one when a bank merger occurs, in order to control for relationships 




th percentile of SBI and SLI; (iii) the alternative measure of SBI and SLI based on the number of interbank 
relationships rather than quantities transacted; (iv) the two alternative computations of the variable Relationship Duration 
(the former obtained removing the smallest exposures; the latter calculated as a ratio between the number of consecutive 
months and the total number of operating months of each bank); (v) the adoption of fixed and random effects in the 
second and third step; (vi) clustering at borrower and lender level; (vii) the inclusion of a time dummy; (viii) the use of 
the other three types of credit ratings taken by Fitch; (ix) removal of the hypothesis that the same rating applies to 
unrated banks of the same group.  
21 Since results always remained very similar to those reported in Tables 5 8, for brevity, I limit the use of additional 
tables, but, all the robustness checks are available from the author upon request.   24
In  addition to the Weibull hazard  function,  I estimated  equations (1.1) (1.2)  using as an 
alternative baseline hazard function for λ0(t) the log logistic, which allows non monotonic duration 
dependence. Consistent with my main results, this regression showed that interbank relationships are 
more likely to end very early, but later on continue to exhibit negative duration dependence. In any 
case, both the larger log likelihood and the smaller AIC values confirmed the preference for the 
Weibull model. 
5.3 Controlling for endogeneity: discarding explanatory variables and IV estimations 
One concern with the fixed effects estimator used in the second step is that the covariates 
should be strictly exogenous and thus should not depend upon the history of Ii,j,t in equation (2.3). To 
verify the stability of each explanatory variable, and in general to test for possible collinearity, I 






i,j,t. The results can be 
summarized as follows. First, only a few regressors exhibit less stability: there are only three in the 
SBI (borrowers’ variables Size, Capital, and Volatility of Liquidity); and there are only two in the 
SLI  (borrowers’  Rating  and  lenders’  Fund  Raising).  Second,  these  regressors  never  switch  the 
statistical significance of their sign. Third, neither their inclusion nor their exclusion is apt to affect 
the other regressors. Fourth, the instability of these five variables would not seem to be due to an 
intrinsic  weakness,  but  to  the  different  roles  played  before  and  after  the  crisis.  As  a  further 
robustness check, I employed the IV estimator for several variables, with a single IV estimator for 
each variable or a multiple endogenous regression, where an instrumental variable is included for 
each potential endogenous regressor. As a vector of instruments, I used either the other regressors or 
the same regressors computed with a two quarter lag. The outcomes were always confirmed.
22 
5.4 Banking group consolidated data 
One  salient  feature  of the  Italian  banking  system  is  the widespread  presence  of  banking 
groups. I have already taken this fact into account because: (i) my key variables in all steps are 
constructed after eliminating interbank transactions involving banks belonging to the same group; 
(ii) I used the net intra group position of each borrower as a control variable. Nevertheless, in order 
to  verify  that  the  composition  and  the  needs  of  groups  do  not  invalidate  my  outcomes,  I  used 
another, more radical, methodology, consolidating all the data of banks affiliated in the same groups, 
                                                 
22 In particular, although they were expected to be  more subject to endogeneity problems, the results were always 
confirmed  for  the  following  variables:  Relationship  Duration;  Liquidity  Shocks  Correlation;  Securities  Interaction; 
borrowers’ Rating; Intra group and Non Domestic Net Interbank Position.   25
thus  transforming  my  bank by bank  data  into  group by group  data.  In  this  way,  I  reran  the 
regressions not  for  each bank  i on  each other  bank j, but  for  each group on  each other group. 
Remarkably, in spite of a drastic reduction in the number of observations and minor changes in 
coefficients and their significance levels, all outcomes remained confirmed.  
5.5 Changing start dates and time spans 
In addition to the inclusion of a time dummy, in order to test the sensitivity of my results on 
different  dates  and  periods,  I  employed  many  checks,  in  particular  in  the  third  step.  First,  I 
experimented with alternatives to August 2007 as the starting point of the meltdown (e.g. Taylor and 
Williamson, 2009). I brought forward the outset of the crisis by one or two months (the idea being 
that some indicators might have changed earlier); also, in the opposite direction, I postponed the 
crisis by one, two, three, or four months (the idea being that some indicators might have changed 
later); moreover, I considered the crisis as beginning in September 2008 (with the Lehman failure 
and exacerbation of the financial crisis). Second, in a similar way, I tested the stability of the results 
of the pre crisis period, which is much longer in my sample, repeating the exercises on different and 
shorter pre crisis sub periods. In particular, I tested the results of my pre  and post crisis comparison 
by juxtaposing two periods of the same length, that is, comparing the last 21 months prior to the 
critical point with my 21 month long post crisis period.
23 In all cases, results remained stable.  
5.6 Adding explanatory variables 
In my exercises, I used four extra explanatory variables, which I chose not to display because 
their time series are shorter or available for a much smaller sub set of banks. The first additional 
regressor is the monthly percentage change in the price of listed banking shares, taken from the 
Italian Stock Exchange. Its effect turned out to be insignificant. Moreover, on average, there were 
only 30 listed banks in Italy during my sample period. The second is the 5 year credit default swap, 
obtained from Datastream. Though interesting, this regressor conflicts with the credit rating and is 
only available for a handful of banks. The third supplementary regressor is interbank interest rates, 
calculated as monthly averages of daily data drawn from the e MID, a multilateral screen based 
trading facility on which banks electronically exchange interbank deposits and loans. As with the 
key  variables,  one  can  learn  the  identity  of  each  borrower  and  lender,  and  how  much  each 
                                                 
23 Furthermore, since the Bank of Italy’s new prudential supervisory reports went into effect as of December 2008, and 
this could have produced some discontinuities in my time series, I repeated all estimations by dropping the last few 
periods.   26
intermediary pays or receives. The results indicate that borrowing banks, which pay a lower interest 
rate, rely more on interbank customer relationships. Nonetheless, while my data on quantities cover 
the whole Italian interbank market, including over the counter transactions, the data sourced from 
the e MID cover only a small market share. The fourth additional regressor is the ratio of securitized 
loans to total assets, the idea being that securitizing banks have an additional channel to satisfy their 
liquidity  needs  (Affinito  and  Tagliaferri,  2010).  However,  the  variable  turns  out  not  to  be 
significant.
24 In any case, the inclusion of these additional variables left the other results unaltered. 
5.7 Secured interbank loans 
An alternative hypothesis to explain the persistence of interbank relationships after the crisis 
is  an  increase  in  collateralized  interbank  lending.
25  Moreover,  the  use  of  collateral  could  have 
affected  my  findings  on  other  specific  covariates.
26  However,  this  hypothesis  seems  to  be 
contradicted by the descriptive statistics. As Figure 6 shows, secured interbank exposures – as a 
share of total domestic inter group interbank exposures – decreased starting in 2002, and this trend 
did not change in  the post crisis period.
27  Nevertheless, I further  checked this  issue by running 
equations (1.1) – (2.3) after splitting the interbank inter group exposures into unsecured and secured 
components, and handling in two alternative ways: either subtracting the secured loans from my 
dependent variables or using the ratio of secured to unsecured interbank exposures as an explanatory 
variable. The results in the two cases are equivalent. Table 9 reports an example of this kind of check 
for  the  second  and  third  steps.  Although  the  additional  variable  (secured/unsecured  interbank 
exposures) is significantly positive, the results remain basically unchanged. 
5.8 Contemporaneous borrowers and lenders 
                                                 
24 Another way of taking account of securitized loans was to add them to the other loans (the same methodology is used 
in Albertazzi and Marchetti 2010 and De Mitri et al., 2010) in two of my regressors: Bad Loans and Total Loans. In fact, 
because of securitizations, outstanding loans could decrease without an actual reduction in credit granted. However, the 
results of my two variables related to loans remained unmodified after this check.  
25 Actually, if this had been the case, then my variable Relationship Duration should have become insignificant, while it 
remains statistically and economically significant (on my entire sample period, before the crisis, and after the crisis). 
Nonetheless,  allowing  for  collateralized  exposures  is  useful,  because  otherwise  (although  interbank  customer 
relationships continued to exist and banks continued to privilege counterparties with a pre existing relationship) one 
might conjecture that, after the onset of the crisis, lending banks started to ask for collateral even from their usual 
counterparties; or it might even be conjectured that interbank customer relationships survived only thanks to an increase 
in collateral.  
26 For example, an increase in collateral could explain the pronounced irrelevance of rating agencies and borrowers’ 
credit scores after the crisis. 
27 The secured exposures are interbank repos, which are secured by definition.   27
In my dataset, some pairs of banks lend to and borrow from each other at the same time. In 
order to verify whether such particular relationships depend on specific determinants, I repeated all 
my exercises both excluding this sub sample of banks and restricting the analysis to it. All results 
were confirmed. In particular, in the second step limited to this sub sample, I found that the variable 
Liquidity Shocks Correlation was always significantly negative, supporting the idea of Cocco et al. 
(2009) that customer relationships allow these banks always to insure against liquidity risk. 
5.9 Outliers and quantile regressions 
Results  were  confirmed  when  I  allowed  for  outliers  in  the  variables  of  my  dataset, 
progressively removing 10, 15 and 20 per cent of tail observations. Results were similar also running 
quantile regressions in all steps of my analysis, though the levels of significance did change a bit. 
This suggests that the existence and the determinants of interbank customer relationships do not 
change after different thresholds.  
5.10 Cooperative banks and branches of foreign banks 
A set of checks was performed on cooperative banks and branches of foreign banks, because 
these two types of institution are often regarded as dissimilar to other banks. The results remained 
stable removing both types from all steps of my analysis and then removing each of them in turn.
28 
Finally,  I  re estimated  my  three  steps  alternatively on the  two  types of banks,  even  though  the 
number of observations was now much smaller. The most interesting effect of this check was that φ 
becomes greater than 1, indicating that interbank customer relationships do not exist, between pairs 
of banks that are both cooperative or both foreign, while they do exist in all other cases. 
6. Conclusions 
As far as I know, the existence of customer relationships between pairs of banks has never 
been explicitly tested, and it is now of particular interest in view of the recent financial crisis. The 
literature on bank firm customer relationships predicts that banks ensure the availability of credit to 
customer firms mainly during crises or in any case when the latter are in trouble. This paper shows 
that  this  also  holds  when  both  borrower  and  lender  are  banks.  Therefore,  interbank  customer 
relationships may well be one of the reasons why in Italy during the 2007 2009 financial crisis banks 
did not lose mutual trust and inter group domestic interbank exposures did not decline. This outcome 
                                                 
28 In the first step, in particular, φ was always less than 1. In the second and third steps, the branches of foreign banks did 
not modify the results, and the only effect of removing the cooperative banks was to make some variables insignificant.   28
carries a relevant policy implication, in that it suggests that mutual confidential knowledge among 
banks and stable interbank relationships facilitate the reallocation of liquidity among banks even in 
crisis situations. The paper also analyzed the determinants of the duration of interbank customer 
relationships and the characteristics of the borrowing and lending banks that rely more heavily on 
interbank customer relationships. The main findings can be briefly summarized. 
First, in Italy interbank customer relationships exist and are durable. My data show that, 
during a sample period of 11 years, they lasted on average at least 5 consecutive years. The duration 
of interbank relationships is longer if borrowing banks are illiquid, small, unrated or well rated, and 
if they engage heavily in lending to firms, households and foreign intermediaries. As to lenders, 
duration is longer if lending banks are liquid, well capitalized, and less heavily engaged in other 
kinds of business. On both the borrowing and the lending side, duration is likely to be greater where 
banks have connections with a greater number of counterparties. 
Second,  substantial  interbank  borrowers  and  lenders  have  definable  characteristics. 
Substantial interbank borrowers tend to be large in size and to have high and volatile liquidity needs. 
Their capitalization is solid, their loan portfolio appears safe, and their business is successful and 
multifaceted: loans, shares, and non domestic investments are high. Moreover, when banks are net 
lenders  inside  their  domestic  group  or  abroad,  the  probability  of  being  a  substantial  interbank 
borrower increases. Substantial lenders are not the most liquid banks, have less lending, shares, and 
foreign business, and as a consequence they do not need to be highly capitalized, although have good 
ratings.  
Third,  in  times  of  financial  stability  banks  seem  to  select  each  other  on  the  basis  of 
observable and testable monitoring factors and indicators and use the judgments of rating agencies as 
a tool for selection. 
Fourth, after the outbreak of the crisis, however, the presence and level of ratings become 
irrelevant, and borrowing banks seem to be selected on the basis of a pre existing relationship, not on 
observable indicators, which indeed signal situations of difficulty. Moreover, not only did the crisis 
fail  to  impede  interbank  customer  relationships,  it  actually  made  healthier  banks  willing  to  be 
substantial  interbank  lenders  and  allowed  lender  banks  not  to  deprive  their  counterparties  of 
interbank funds. These outcomes confirm for interbank customer relationships the consensus thesis 
of the literature on bank firm customer relationships.   29
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1. Summary statistics of key variables: duration and strength of interbank customer relationships 
Step  Name   Definition   Obs  Mean  Sd.Dev.  Min  25  75  Max 
a) Computed as the average of the ongoing 
duration in each period (Ts in equation 1.1)   417,360   28.11  29.09  1  7  41  131   
b) Computed as the average of the final 








Duration or span: 




between each pair 
of banks ends or 
breaks 
c) Computed as the average of the final 
duration of the longest relationship of each 
bank 
417,360  96.06  40.19  1  61  130  131   
SLI   Relevant 
Lender Index 
(equation 2.1) 
Total loans from each j to each i / Total 







SBI   Relevant 
Borrower Index 
(equation 2.2) 
Total loans from each i to each j / Total 
interbank loans from each i   460,964  0.19  0.33  0  0.01  0.36  1   
Number of 
lenders 
Inverse of the alternative measure of SLI: 
one / number of banks that i borrows from 
during each period 









Inverse of the alternative measure of SBI: 
one / number of banks that i lends to during 
each period  
460,964  5.25  12.83  1  1  3  60   
 
Table 2. Relations among key variables 





lenders  SBI  SLI 
average  max 
1
st quartile  1     1     65  103 
2
nd quartile  2     0.50     53  106 
3
rd quartile  3     0.33     40  102 
Number of borrowers 
computed as, first the total number of borrowers for 
each lender in each period, and then the average at the 
same time cross section and over time 
4
th quartile  17.98     0.12     22  96 
1
st quartile     1     1  60  106 
2
nd quartile     2     0.50  40  99 
3
rd quartile     4     0.28  29  86 
Number of lenders 
computed as, first the total number of lenders for each 
borrower in each period, and then the average at the 
same time cross section and over time 
4
th quartile     27.58     0.07  25  93 
1
st quartile  14.30     0.17     26  97 
2
nd quartile  2     0.50     53  106 
3
rd quartile  1     1     65  103 
SBI 
computed as, first the average value by lender and 
period, and then the average at the same time cross 
section and over time 
4
th quartile  1     1     65  103 
1
st quartile     25.60     0.08  20  92 
2
nd quartile     2.51     0.43  35  95 
3
rd quartile     1     1  60  106 
SLI 
computed as, first the average value by borrower and 
period, and then the average at the same time cross 
section and over time 
4
th quartile     1     1  60  106 
1
st quartile  6.40  8.12  0.43  0.40  10  56 
2
nd quartile  10.13  14.30  0.47  0.43  27  90 
3
rd quartile  3.82  6.48  0.76  0.80  53  115 
Average 
computed as, first the final duration of each 
relationship, and then average of the final 
duration of all relationships 
4
th quartile  1.37  1.22  0.84  0.91  101  124 
1
st quartile  3.72  6.12  0.65  0.53  17  35 
2
nd quartile  6.85  9.82  0.52  0.48  41  93 
3












computed as, first the final duration of each 
relationship, and then average of the final 
duration of each bank's longest relationship 
4
th quartile  5.10  8.12  0.69  0.70  66  129   33
Figure 1. Interbank loans in Italy 
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Figure 3. SLI and SBI, computed on end-of-month exposures 
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Figure 4. Average number of banks lending to and borrowing from each bank 
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Upper panels report distribution of final duration as percentage shares of number of banks; lower panel as percentage shares of interbank market exposures. 
Left side reports duration in terms of number of months; right side as a percentage of the effective presence in the interbank market.  
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Table 3. Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
Type Name Definition Source Obs Mean Sd. 
Dev.
Min 25 75 Max
borrower
Size Log (Total assets) Bank of Italy 456,099        8.30 1.92 0 7.11 9.56 12.97  
Capital  Capital / Total assets Bank of Italy 453,247        0.09 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.10 1  
Bad loans  Bad loans / Total loans Bank of Italy 454,373        0.05 0.09 0 0.01 0.06 1  
Structure of income/Opacity Non interest income / Net interest income Bank of Italy 439,170        1.41 15.53 0 1.25 1.87 4.6  
Banks without rating (0 1) Banks without rating (0 1)
The rating agency Fitch through
 the database of Bloomberg 460,964        0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1  
Rating Rating agency scores
The rating agency Fitch through
 the database of Bloomberg 385,061        8.29 3.30 2 5 11 11  
ROE Net profits / Capital Bank of Italy 438,081        0.17 11.24 0 0.00 0.05 0.34  
Funds Raising Total deposits and bonds / Total assets Bank of Italy 456,099        0.49 0.26 0 0.25 0.70 1  
Volatility of Liquidity 
Coefficient variation of balance sheet items measuring 
banking liquidity: deposits, bonds issued, and euro area 
Government securities held in portfolio 
Bank of Italy 458,147        0.03 0.03 0 0.01 0.03 0.916  
Total loans  Total loans / Total assets Bank of Italy 456,099        0.47 0.25 0 0.30 0.65 1  
Non domestic assets Non domestic assets / Total assets Bank of Italy 456,099        0.03 0.04 0 0.00 0.03 0.93  
Total shares  Total shares / Total assets Bank of Italy 456,099        0.04 0.06 0 0.01 0.05 1  
Intra group
interbank net position   
Intra group
interbank net position   





Bank of Italy 426,739         0.07 0.28  1 0.22 0.04 1  
lender
Size Log (Total assets) Bank of Italy 458,574        8.36 1.93 0 7.14 9.65 12.97  
Capital  Capital / Total assets Bank of Italy 457,340        0.09 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.10 1  
Bad loans  Bad loans / Total loans Bank of Italy 456,482        0.05 0.08 0 0.01 0.06 1  
Structure of income/Opacity Non interest income / Net interest income Bank of Italy 445,772        1.50 15.70 0 1.29 1.88 3.1  
Banks without rating (0 1) Banks without rating (0 1)
The rating agency Fitch through
 the database of Bloomberg 460,964        0.46 0.50 0 0 1 1  
Rating Rating agency scores
The rating agency Fitch through
 the database of Bloomberg 402,523        7.97 3.36 2 5 11 11  
ROE Net profits / Capital Bank of Italy 448,941        0.19 12.76 0 0.00 0.05 0.34  
Funds Raising Total deposits and bonds / Total assets Bank of Italy 458,574        0.50 0.25 0 0.29 0.70 1  
Volatility of Liquidity 
Coefficient variation of balance sheet items measuring 
banking liquidity: deposits, bonds issued, and euro area 
Government securities held in portfolio 
Bank of Italy 460,915        0.03 0.03 0 0.01 0.03 0.944  
Total loans  Total loans / Total assets Bank of Italy 458,574        0.47 0.25 0 0.31 0.65 1  
Non domestic assets Non domestic assets / Total assets Bank of Italy 458,574        0.03 0.04 0 0.00 0.03 0.909  
Total shares  Total shares / Total assets Bank of Italy 458,574        0.04 0.06 0 0.01 0.05 0.949  
borrower and lender
Lending relationship duration
Number of consecutive months since the start of lending 
relationship between each pair of banks
Bank of Italy 460,964        26.21 29.24 0 4 38 131  
Borrowing relationship duration
Number of consecutive months since the start of 
borrowing relationship between each pair of banks
Bank of Italy 460,964        26.41 29.61 0 4 38 131  
Liquidity Liquidity shocks correlation 
Correlation between the liquidity shocks of each pair of 
banks
Bank of Italy 447,448        0.05 0.52  1  0.29 0.42 1  
Securities Interaction
(lender vs.borrower)
Securities held by the lender issued by the borrower / 
Total securities held by the lender issued by banks
Bank of Italy 458,574        0.14 0.34 0 0 0.03 1  
Securities Interaction
(borrower vs. lender)
Securities held by the borrower issued by the lender / 
Total securities held by the borrower issued by banks
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Table 4. Explanatory variables: matrixes and effects 







↓Effect  borrower’s regressors  lender’s regressors  borrower’s and 
lender’s regressors 
(1)                                                                                       
Persistency 





Banks without Rating 
Rating 
(2)                                         
Agency problems 
ROE 





Banks without Rating 
Rating 





Fund Raising  Fund Raising  (4)                                




Non Domestic Assets 
Total Shares 
Intra Group  
Interbank  Net Position 
(5)                                
Liquidity motivations 
Non Domestic 
Interbank Net Position 
Total Loans 






(6)                            
Interaction outside 
the interbank market 
   
Lender borrower 
Securities Interaction 
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Table 5. First step: stability and existence of interbank customer relationship 
(6) (7)
0.576 *** 0.608 *** 0.618 *** 0.626 *** 0.634 *** 0.644 *** 0.638 ***
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005
1.218 *** 1.163 *** 1.253 *** 1.198 *** 1.178 *** 1.209 ***
0.007 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.016
 0.568 *  0.543 *  0.452 **  0.421 **  0.111 ***  0.195 ***
0.183 0.184 0.146 0.142 0.049 0.085
0.930 ns 0.856 ns
0.142 0.122
 0.998 **  0.998 **
0.001 0.001
 0.719 ***  0.797 **  0.714 ***  0.673 ***
0.070 0.082 0.082 0.078
1.090 *** 1.072 *** 1.077 *** 1.104 ***
0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019
 0.999 **  0.999 *
0.001 0.001
6.452 *** 6.749 *** 4.692 *** 5.049 *** 6.154 *** 5.244 ***
0.541 0.584 0.383 0.425 0.569 0.470
5.339 *** 2.972 **
2.303 1.285
 0.262 ***  0.295 ***  0.208 ***  0.230 ***  0.142 ***  0.127 ***
0.018 0.021 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.011
0.555 ns 0.132 ns
0.210 0.050
1.174 ns 0.747 ns
0.319 0.207
 0.164 ***  0.206 ***
0.010 0.012




1.193 *** 1.266 *** 1.145 *** 1.212 *** 1.149 *** 1.305 ***
0.008 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.016
 0.299 ***  0.103 ***  0.296 ***  0.118 ***  0.021 ***  0.019 ***
0.069 0.029 0.070 0.034 0.007 0.008
3.304 *** 2.379 ***
0.425 0.302
0.998 ns 0.999 ns
0.002 0.001
1.026 ns 1.073 ns 1.488 *** 0.878 ns
0.099 0.109 0.155 0.096
1.055 *** 1.042 *** 0.991 ns 1.095 ***
0.015 0.015 0.015 0.017
 0.996 ***  0.995 *
0.001 0.004
 0.511 ***  0.493 ***  0.686 ***  0.662 ***  0.679 ***  0.619 ***
0.027 0.028 0.039 0.039 0.046 0.041
12.591 *** 5.073 ***
3.380 1.400
2.713 *** 1.878 *** 2.543 *** 1.790 *** 2.969 *** 1.786 ***
0.151 0.112 0.147 0.111 0.224 0.133
0.977 ns 0.246 ns
0.369 0.097




1.069 ** 1.047 ns 1.006 ns 0.984 ns 1.023 ns 0.980 ns
0.035 0.035 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.035
 0.631 ***  0.605 ***  0.598 ***  0.572 ***  0.590 ***  0.499 ***
0.033 0.035 0.032 0.033 0.037 0.033
 0.527 ***  0.552 ***  0.574 ***  0.593 ***  0.603 ***  0.453 ***
0.025 0.026 0.030 0.031 0.035 0.027
yes yes yes yes yes yes
 0.551 ***  0.497 ***  0.481 ***  0.469 ***  0.456 ***  0.439 ***  0.450 ***
0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007


























































































Volatility of Liquidity 
Total loans 
Non domestic assets













































































































































        Counterpart dummies
        Constant

















































Liquidity shocks correlation 
Securities Interaction
 (borrower vs. lender)
Securities Interaction
 (lender vs. borrower)
 
With regard to estimations, Table 5 reports the signs, hazard ratios, robust standard errors in italics, and statistical significance. Due to 
the inverse relationship between duration and the hazard rate, a negative sign of regressors indicates a longer duration, and a positive 
sign implies a shorter duration. With regard to marginal effects, Table reports the change of duration in number of months passing 
from the 25th to the 75th distribution percentile of each regressor (only for Specification (6) and (7). ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level; ns means not significant.   39
Table 6. Second step: strength and determinants 
SLI SBI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 0.024 ***  0.024 ***  0.031 ***  0.028 ***  0.032 ***  0.035 ***  0.034 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.009 *** 0.011 *** 0.008 *** 0.001
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.209 *** 0.295 *** 0.235 *** 0.294 *** 0.261 *** 0.241 *** 0.210 *** 0.037 *** 0.023 ** 0.015 0.026 *** 0.058 *** 0.019 *  0.017
0.010 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.015
0.044 *** 0.037 ***  0.069 ***  0.052 ***
0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008
 0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001  0.001
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 0.061 ***  0.066 ***  0.058 ***  0.063 ***  0.031 ***  0.028 ***  0.030 ***  0.033 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
0.001 * 0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.089 *** 0.067 *** 0.087 *** 0.054 *** 0.063 *** 0.064 ***  0.059 ***  0.068 ***  0.030 ***  0.023 ***  0.038 ***  0.038 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
 0.072 ***  0.083 *** 0.013 0.019 *
0.010 0.011 0.009 0.011
0.103 *** 0.073 *** 0.094 *** 0.061 *** 0.066 *** 0.054 *** 0.020 *** 0.020 *** 0.005 * 0.023 *** 0.005 * 0.021 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
 0.153 ***  0.139 *** 0.077 *** 0.048 ***
0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012
 0.174 ***  0.166 *** 0.038 *** 0.029 ***
0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010
 0.040 *** 0.010 ***
0.002 0.002
 0.035 *** 0.007 ***
0.001 0.001
0.013 *** 0.010 *** 0.015 *** 0.008 *** 0.017 *** 0.014 *** 0.019 ***  0.056 ***  0.055 ***  0.066 ***  0.048 ***  0.051 ***  0.055 ***  0.051 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
 0.029 ***  0.033 ***  0.023 ***  0.049 ***  0.016 ***  0.039 ***  0.055 *** 0.067 *** 0.095 *** 0.117 *** 0.128 *** 0.087 *** 0.146 *** 0.119 ***
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007




0.023 *** 0.024 *** 0.027 ***  0.025 ***  0.028 ***  0.021 ***
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
 0.007 ***  0.006 ***  0.006 ***  0.005 ***  0.005 ***  0.006 ***
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000
 0.004  0.005  0.007 **  0.004  0.010 ***  0.007 *  0.029 ***  0.034 ***  0.040 ***  0.012 ***  0.045 ***  0.054 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
 0.032 ***  0.073 *** 0.044 *** 0.065 ***
0.011 0.012 0.013 0.016
 0.014 ***  0.009 ***  0.008 ***  0.005 *  0.006 * 0.090 *** 0.073 *** 0.120 *** 0.101 *** 0.091 ***
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
 0.076 ***  0.064 ***
0.011 0.011
 0.023 **  0.117 ***
0.011 0.011
0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.003 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.034 *** 0.027 *** 0.028 *** 0.020 *** 0.025 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 ***  0.005 ***  0.003 **  0.007 ***  0.009 ***  0.003 ***  0.005 ***  0.007 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.035 *** 0.024 *** 0.021 *** 0.019 *** 0.036 *** 0.037 *** 0.031 *** 0.031 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.076 0.192 0.116 0.223 0.280 ** 0.252 **  0.281 0.288 **  0.001  0.140  0.146 0.750 *** 0.187 0.030 0.540 *** 0.484 ***
30.3 0.1 0.1 59.4 0.1  0.1 77.5 0.1 32.5 27.7 27.6 0.1 45.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
405,520    399,964    399,964    326,123    348,944    313,517    280,165    253,200    444,335    438,232    438,232    381,688    364,682    345,024    313,379    277,541   









































 (borrower vs. lender)
ROE
Fund Raising
Volatility of Liquidity 
Total loans 
Banks without rating (0 1)
Rating
Relationship duration

























































































































































































Banks without rating (0 1)
Rating
 
Table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors in italics. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level   40
Table 7: Third step: over the crisis - statistical significance 
SLI SBI
Total period pre crisis post crisis Total period pre crisis post crisis
 0.034 ***  0.033 ***  0.052 *** 0.001 0.003 **  0.004
0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.007
0.210 *** 0.243 ***  0.154 *  0.017  0.002  0.005
0.014 0.015 0.091 0.015 0.016 0.083
0.037 *** 0.040 *** 0.077  0.052 ***  0.045 ***  0.117 **
0.008 0.008 0.048 0.008 0.008 0.047
0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 0.063 ***  0.063 ***  0.019  0.033 *** 0.012 ***  0.018
0.004 0.004 0.028 0.004 0.004 0.025
0.000 0.000 0.008 ** 0.005 ***  0.002 *** 0.005
0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003
0.000 0.000  0.025 * 0.000 0.000 0.032 ***
0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.011
0.064 *** 0.031 *** 0.261 ***  0.038 ***  0.040 ***  0.049 ***
0.004 0.004 0.021 0.004 0.004 0.015
 0.083 ***  0.077 ***  0.110 *** 0.019 * 0.034 *** 0.029
0.011 0.012 0.024 0.011 0.012 0.024
0.054 *** 0.055 ***  0.066 *** 0.021 *** 0.041 ***  0.003
0.003 0.004 0.020 0.003 0.004 0.016
 0.166 ***  0.158 ***  0.209 *** 0.029 *** 0.026 ** 0.085 **
0.009 0.010 0.044 0.010 0.010 0.039
 0.139 ***  0.135 ***  0.111 * 0.048 ***  0.003 0.068
0.012 0.013 0.057 0.012 0.014 0.047
 0.040 ***  0.037 ***  0.134 *** 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.018 ***
0.002 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.006
 0.035 ***  0.031 ***  0.089 *** 0.007 *** 0.002 0.030 ***
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.004
0.019 *** 0.011 *** 0.057 ***  0.051 ***  0.050 ***  0.102 ***
0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.008
 0.055 ***  0.061 *** 0.131 * 0.119 *** 0.125 ***  0.322 ***
0.007 0.007 0.068 0.007 0.007 0.069
0.027 *** 0.026 *** 0.197 ***  0.112 ***  0.104 *** 0.020
0.007 0.007 0.053 0.009 0.009 0.042
0.000 0.001 ***  0.001 *** 0.000  0.001 *** 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.027 *** 0.019 ***  0.118 ***  0.021 ***  0.022 ***  0.152 ***
0.004 0.004 0.032 0.004 0.004 0.030
 0.006 ***  0.005 *** 0.017 ***  0.006 ***  0.004 *** 0.004
0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.012
 0.007 *  0.009 ** 0.045 **  0.054 ***  0.044 ***  0.117 ***
0.004 0.004 0.021 0.004 0.004 0.020
 0.073 ***  0.047 ***  0.176 *** 0.065 *** 0.045 *** 0.345 ***
0.012 0.013 0.036 0.016 0.016 0.055
 0.006 * 0.002 0.120 *** 0.091 *** 0.100 *** 0.000
0.003 0.003 0.021 0.003 0.004 0.020
 0.023 **  0.018 *  0.078  0.117 ***  0.088 ***  0.156 ***
0.011 0.011 0.052 0.011 0.011 0.042
 0.076 ***  0.036 ***  0.189 ***  0.064 ***  0.094 ***  0.080
0.011 0.012 0.053 0.011 0.012 0.050
0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.007 ***  0.003 ***  0.002 ***  0.002
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
0.016 *** 0.007 *** 0.009 *  0.007 *** 0.003 ** 0.002
0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.004
0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.014 *** 0.031 *** 0.034 ***  0.008 **
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004
yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.288 ** 0.275 **  0.240 0.484 *** 0.442 *** 0.962 ***
0.122 0.117 0.159 0.133 0.126 0.161
253,200 219,325 33,875 277,541 232,574 44,967











Counterpart dummies  
Duration Relationship duration
Liquidity Liquidity shocks correlation 
Liquidity provisions
Funds Raising




















Intra group interbank net position   
Non domestic interbank net position
Number of observations 










Table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors in italics. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level. 
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Table 8. Third step: over the crisis - marginal effects 
 
SLI  SBI   
pre crisis  post crisis  pre crisis  post crisis 
Average values of the indexes  0.112  0.179  0.131  0.222 
borrower 
Size   35.9   35.2  20.9  n.s. 
Capital  15.5   5.5  n.s.  n.s. 
Bad loans  0.0  n.s.  0.0   0.5 
Structure of income/Opacity  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.   0.1 
Banks without rating (0 1)   45.1  n.s.  15.7  n.s. 
Rating  n.s.  39.2   10.2  n.s. 
Agency 
problems 
ROE  n.s.   1.1  n.s.  0.1 
Funds Raising  14.4  18.8   23.8   21.7  Liquidity needs 
Volatility of Liquidity   1.8   1.7  0.8  n.s. 
Total loans  30.5   14.0  3.7  n.s. 
Non domestic assets   5.9   5.9  1.5  5.2 
Total shares   3.4   2.2  n.s.  n.s. 
Intra group interbank net position   0.9   2.2  0.1  0.5 
Liquidity 
motivations 
Non domestic interbank net position   6.9   11.2  n.s.  7.6 
lender 
Size  15.4  24.7   58.8   64.6 
Capital   1.8  1.1  5.6   4.8 
Bad loans  0.0  1.1   4.4  n.s. 
Structure of income/Opacity  0.1   0.1   0.1  n.s. 
Banks without rating (0 1)  29.2   3.4   16.8   43.4 
Rating   17.1  4.4   18.8  n.s. 
Lending 
capacity 
ROE  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
Funds Raising   14.8  2.7   9.4   17.1  Liquidity 
provisions  Volatility of Liquidity   0.9   0.6  0.8  2.7 
Total loans  n.s.  17.0  29.8  n.s. 
Non domestic assets   4.6  n.s.   3.0   3.5  Liquidity 
motivations 
Total shares   0.9   2.7   2.3  n.s. 
borrower and lender 
Duration  Relationship duration  20.5  3.1  13.4  16.6 
Liquidity  Liquidity shocks correlation  2.7  1.1   1.5  n.s. 
Securities Interaction (borrower vs. 
lender) 




Securities Interaction (lender vs. 
borrower) 
0.0  0.0  0.1   0.1 
 
Table displays the percentage change that indexes SLI and SBI undergo passing from the 25
th to the 75
th distribution percentile of each 
regressor, before and after the crisis.   42
 
Figure 6. Secured interbank loans 
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Table 9: Allowing for secured interbank loans 
SBI
pre crisis post crisis pre crisis post crisis
 0.031 ***  0.053 *** 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.008 0.001 0.007
0.238 ***  0.136 *  0.021 0.002
0.014 0.088 0.015 0.082
0.047 ***  0.005  0.038 ***  0.102 **
0.008 0.047 0.008 0.046
0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001 *
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 0.059 *** 0.025 0.008 ** 0.006
0.004 0.027 0.004 0.025
 0.001 0.002 *  0.001 ** 0.002
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
0.000  0.027 ** 0.000 0.036 ***
0.000 0.013 0.000 0.011
0.019 *** 0.248 ***  0.045 ***  0.041 ***
0.004 0.020 0.004 0.015
 0.084 ***  0.095 *** 0.007 * 0.025
0.011 0.024 0.004 0.024
0.061 ***  0.062 *** 0.047 ***  0.009
0.003 0.020 0.004 0.016
 0.121 ***  0.152 *** 0.053 ** 0.098 **
0.012 0.055 0.010 0.038
 0.153 ***  0.118 ***  0.007 0.026
0.009 0.043 0.013 0.046
 0.035 ***  0.138 *** 0.009 *** 0.018 ***
0.002 0.008 0.002 0.006
 0.027 ***  0.090 ***  0.002 0.027 ***
0.001 0.005 0.002 0.004
0.011 *** 0.049 ***  0.046 ***  0.102 ***
0.001 0.008 0.001 0.008
 0.059 *** 0.099 * 0.126 ***  0.320 ***
0.006 0.066 0.007 0.067
0.031 *** 0.198 ***  0.091 *** 0.003
0.007 0.051 0.009 0.041
0.001 **  0.001 **  0.001 *** 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.011 ***  0.076 ***  0.019 ***  0.130 ***
0.004 0.031 0.004 0.029
 0.003 *** 0.011 ***  0.005 ***  0.001
0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
0.000  0.001 0.000  0.001
0.000 0.005 0.000 0.012
 0.009 ** 0.035 *  0.039 ***  0.128 ***
0.004 0.020 0.004 0.019
 0.083 ***  0.174 *** 0.031 ** 0.326 ***
0.012 0.035 0.015 0.054
0.006 * 0.115 *** 0.096 *** 0.006
0.003 0.021 0.004 0.020
 0.012 *  0.035  0.099 ***  0.158 ***
0.010 0.050 0.012 0.042
 0.033 ***  0.108 ***  0.077 ***  0.062
0.011 0.051 0.011 0.049
0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 *** 0.007 ***  0.002 ***  0.002
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
0.007 *** 0.009 * 0.003 ** 0.002
0.001 0.005 0.002 0.004
0.006 *** 0.014 *** 0.034 ***  0.008 **
0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
0.809 *** 0.609 *** 0.731 *** 0.742 ***
0.006 0.013 0.005 0.017
yes yes yes yes
0.226 **  0.170 0.431 *** 1.012 ***
0.015 0.111 0.120 0.158
219,325 33,875 232,574 44,967
0.23 0.21 0.20 0.40
SLI
Garantees Secured / unsecured interbank loans
Number of observations 
















Intra group interbank net position   






Banks without rating (0 1)
Rating
ROE
Liquidity Liquidity shocks correlation 
Liquidity provisions
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Interaction outside the 
interbank market
Securities Interaction (borrower vs. lender)
Securities Interaction(lender vs. borrower)
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Duration Relationship duration
 




N.	 804	 –	 Il  miglioramento  qualitativo  delle  produzioni  italiane:  evidenze  da  prezzi  e 
strategie delle imprese,	by	Valter	di	Giacinto	and	Giacinto	Micucci	(April	2011).
N.	 805	 –	 What  determines  annuity  demand  at  retirement?,	 by	 Giuseppe	 Cappelletti,	
Giovanni	Guazzarotti	and	Pietro	Tommasino	(April	2011).
N.	 806	 –	 Heterogeneity  and  learning  with  complete  markets,	 by	 Sergio	 Santoro	 (April	
2011).
N.	 807	 –	 Housing, consumption and monetary policy: how different are the U.S. and the 
euro area?,	by	Alberto	Musso,	Stefano	Neri	and	Livio	Stracca	(April	2011).
N.	 808	 –	 The monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area: has it changed and why?,	
by	Martina	Cecioni	and	Stefano	Neri	(April	2011).
N.	 809	 –	 Convergence clubs, the euro-area rank and the relationship between banking and 
real convergence,	by	Massimiliano	Affinito	(June	2011).
N.	 810	 –	 The  welfare  effect  of  foreign  monetary  conservatism  with  non-atomistic  wage 
setters,	by	Vincenzo	Cuciniello	(June	2011).
N.	 811	 –	 Schooling and youth mortality: learning from a mass military exemption,	by	Piero	
Cipollone	and	Alfonso	Rosolia	(June	2011).
N.	 812	 –	 Welfare costs of inflation and the circulation of US currency abroad,	by	Alessandro	
Calza	and	Andrea	Zaghini	(June	2011).
N.	 813	 –	 Legal  status  of  immigrants  and  criminal  behavior:  evidence  from  a  natural 
experiment,	by		Giovanni	Mastrobuoni	and	Paolo	Pinotti	(June	2011).
N.	 814	 –	 An unexpected crisis? Looking at pricing effectiveness of different banks,	by	Valerio	
Vacca	(July	2011).
N.	 815	 –	 Skills or culture? An analysis of the decision to work by immigrant women in Italy,	
by	Antonio	Accetturo	and	Luigi	Infante	(July	2011).
N.	 816	 –	 Home bias in interbank lending and banks’ resolution regimes,	by	Michele	Manna	
(July	2011).
N.	 817	 –	 Macroeconomic determinants of carry trade activity,	by	Alessio	Anzuini	and	Fabio	
Fornari	(September	2011).
N.	 818	 –	 Leaving home and housing prices. The experience of Italian youth emancipation,	
by	Francesca	Modena	and	Concetta	Rondinelli		(September	2011).
N.	 819	 –	 The interbank market after the financial turmoil: squeezing liquidity in a “lemons 
market” or asking liquidity “on tap”,	by	Antonio	De	Socio	(September	2011).
N.	 820	 –	 The relationship between the PMI and the Italian index of industrial production and 
the impact of the latest economic crisis,	by	Valentina	Aprigliano	(September	2011).
N.	 821	 –	 Inside the sovereign credit default swap market: price discovery, announcements, 
market behaviour and corporate sector,	by	Alessandro	Carboni	(September	2011).
N.	 822	 –	 The demand for energy of Italian households,	by	Ivan	Faiella	(September	2011).
N.	 823	 –	 Sull’ampiezza ottimale delle giurisdizioni locali: il caso delle province italiane,	by	
Guglielmo	Barone	(September	2011).
N.	 824	 –	 The public-private pay gap: a robust quantile approach,	by	Domenico	Depalo	and	





P. ANGELINI, Liquidity and announcement effects in the euro area, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di 
Economia, v. 67, 1, pp. 1-20, TD No. 451 (October 2002). 
P. ANGELINI, P. DEL GIOVANE, S. SIVIERO and  D. TERLIZZESE, Monetary policy in a monetary union: What 
role for regional information?, International Journal of Central Banking, v. 4, 3, pp. 1-28, TD No. 
457 (December 2002). 
F.  SCHIVARDI  and R. TORRINI,  Identifying the effects of firing restrictions through size-contingent 
Differences in regulation, Labour Economics, v. 15, 3, pp. 482-511,  TD No. 504 (June 2004). 
L. GUISO and M. PAIELLA,, Risk aversion, wealth and background risk, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, v. 6, 6, pp. 1109-1150, TD No. 483 (September 2003). 
C. BIANCOTTI, G. D'ALESSIO and A. NERI, Measurement errors in the Bank of Italy’s survey of household 
income and wealth, Review of Income and Wealth, v. 54, 3, pp. 466-493, TD No. 520 (October 2004). 
S. MOMIGLIANO, J. HENRY and P. HERNÁNDEZ  DE COS, The impact of government budget on prices: 
Evidence from macroeconometric models, Journal of Policy Modelling, v. 30, 1, pp. 123-143 TD No. 
523 (October 2004). 
L. GAMBACORTA, How do banks set interest rates?, European Economic Review, v. 52, 5, pp. 792-819,  
TD No. 542 (February 2005). 
P. ANGELINI and A. GENERALE, On the evolution of firm size distributions, American Economic Review, 
v. 98, 1, pp. 426-438, TD No. 549 (June 2005). 
R. FELICI and M. PAGNINI, Distance, bank heterogeneity and entry in local banking markets, The Journal 
of Industrial Economics, v. 56, 3, pp. 500-534,  No. 557 (June 2005). 
S. DI ADDARIO and E. PATACCHINI, Wages and the city. Evidence from Italy, Labour Economics, v.15, 5, 
pp. 1040-1061, TD No. 570 (January 2006). 
S. SCALIA, Is foreign exchange intervention effective?, Journal of International Money and Finance, v. 27, 4, 
pp. 529-546,  TD No. 579 (February 2006). 
M. PERICOLI and M. TABOGA, Canonical term-structure models with observable factors and the dynamics 
of bond risk premia, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, v. 40, 7, pp. 1471-88, TD No. 580 
(February 2006). 
E. VIVIANO, Entry regulations and labour market outcomes. Evidence from the Italian retail trade sector, 
Labour Economics, v. 15, 6, pp. 1200-1222, TD No. 594 (May 2006). 
S. FEDERICO and G. A. MINERVA, Outward FDI and local employment growth in Italy, Review of World 
Economics, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, v. 144, 2, pp. 295-324, TD No. 613 (February 
2007). 
F. BUSETTI and A. HARVEY, Testing for trend, Econometric Theory, v. 24, 1, pp. 72-87, TD No. 614 
(February 2007). 
V. CESTARI, P. DEL GIOVANE and C. ROSSI-ARNAUD, Memory for prices and the Euro cash changeover: an 
analysis for cinema prices in Italy, In P. Del Giovane e R. Sabbatini (eds.), The Euro Inflation and 
Consumers’ Perceptions. Lessons from Italy, Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer, TD No. 619 (February 2007). 
B. H. HALL, F. LOTTI and J. MAIRESSE, Employment, innovation and productivity: evidence from Italian 
manufacturing microdata, Industrial and Corporate Change, v. 17, 4, pp. 813-839, TD No. 622 (April 
2007). 
J. SOUSA  and  A.  ZAGHINI,  Monetary policy shocks in the Euro Area and global liquidity spillovers, 
International Journal of Finance and Economics, v.13, 3, pp. 205-218, TD No. 629 (June 2007). 
M. DEL GATTO, GIANMARCO I. P. OTTAVIANO and M. PAGNINI, Openness to trade and  industry cost 
dispersion: Evidence from a panel of Italian firms, Journal of Regional Science, v. 48, 1, pp. 97-
129, TD No. 635 (June 2007). 
P.  DEL  GIOVANE,  S.  FABIANI  and  R.  SABBATINI,  What’s behind “inflation perceptions”? A survey-based 
analysis of Italian consumers, in P. Del Giovane e R. Sabbatini (eds.), The Euro Inflation and 
Consumers’ Perceptions. Lessons from Italy, Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer, TD  No.  655  (January 
2008). 
R. BRONZINI, G. DE BLASIO, G. PELLEGRINI and A. SCOGNAMIGLIO, La valutazione del credito d’imposta per gli 
investimenti, Rivista di politica economica, v. 98, 4, pp. 79-112, TD No. 661 (April 2008). B. BORTOLOTTI, and P. PINOTTI, Delayed privatization, Public Choice, v. 136, 3-4, pp. 331-351, TD No. 
663 (April 2008). 
R. BONCI and F. COLUMBA, Monetary policy effects: New evidence from the Italian flow of funds, Applied 
Economics , v. 40, 21, pp. 2803-2818, TD No. 678 (June 2008). 
M. CUCCULELLI, and G. MICUCCI, Family Succession and firm performance: evidence from Italian family 
firms, Journal of Corporate Finance, v. 14, 1, pp. 17-31, TD No. 680 (June 2008). 
A. SILVESTRINI and D. VEREDAS, Temporal aggregation of univariate and multivariate time series models: 




F. PANETTA, F. SCHIVARDI and M. SHUM, Do mergers improve information? Evidence from the loan market, 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, v. 41, 4, pp. 673-709, TD No. 521 (October 2004). 
M. BUGAMELLI  and  F.  PATERNÒ,  Do workers’ remittances reduce the probability of current account 
reversals?, World Development, v. 37, 12, pp. 1821-1838, TD No. 573 (January 2006). 
P. PAGANO and M. PISANI, Risk-adjusted forecasts of oil prices, The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, v. 
9, 1, Article 24, TD No. 585 (March 2006). 
M. PERICOLI and M. SBRACIA,  The CAPM and the risk appetite index: theoretical differences, empirical 
similarities, and implementation problems, International Finance, v. 12, 2, pp. 123-150, TD No. 
586 (March 2006). 
U.  ALBERTAZZI  and L.  GAMBACORTA,  Bank profitability and the business cycle, Journal of Financial 
Stability, v. 5, 4, pp. 393-409,  TD No. 601 (September 2006). 
S. MAGRI, The financing of small innovative firms: the Italian case,  Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology, v. 18, 2, pp. 181-204,  TD No. 640 (September 2007). 
V.  DI  GIACINTO  and G.  MICUCCI,  The producer service sector in Italy: long-term growth and its local 
determinants, Spatial Economic Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 391-425,  TD No. 643 (September 2007). 
F. LORENZO, L. MONTEFORTE and L. SESSA, The general equilibrium effects of fiscal policy: estimates for the 
euro area, Journal of Public Economics, v. 93, 3-4, pp. 559-585, TD No. 652 (November 2007). 
R. GOLINELLI and S. MOMIGLIANO, The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area. A Critical 
Survey of Empirical Research, Fiscal Studies, v. 30, 1, pp. 39-72, TD No. 654 (January 2008). 
P. DEL GIOVANE, S. FABIANI and R. SABBATINI, What’s behind “Inflation Perceptions”? A survey-based 
analysis of Italian consumers, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, v. 68, 1, pp. 25-
52, TD No. 655 (January 2008). 
F. MACCHERONI, M. MARINACCI, A. RUSTICHINI and M. TABOGA, Portfolio selection with monotone mean-
variance preferences, Mathematical Finance, v. 19, 3, pp. 487-521, TD No. 664 (April 2008). 
M. AFFINITO and M. PIAZZA, What are borders made of? An analysis of barriers to European banking 
integration, in P. Alessandrini, M. Fratianni and A. Zazzaro (eds.): The Changing Geography of 
Banking and Finance, Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York, Springer, TD No. 666 (April 2008). 
A. BRANDOLINI,  On applying synthetic indices of multidimensional well-being: health and income 
inequalities in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, in R. Gotoh and P. Dumouchel 
(eds.), Against Injustice. The New Economics of Amartya Sen, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, TD No. 668 (April 2008). 
G. FERRERO and A. NOBILI, Futures contract rates as monetary policy forecasts, International Journal of 
Central Banking, v. 5, 2, pp. 109-145, TD No. 681 (June 2008). 
P. CASADIO, M. LO CONTE and A. NERI, Balancing work and family in Italy: the new mothers’ employment 
decisions around childbearing, in T. Addabbo and G. Solinas (eds.), Non-Standard Employment and 
Qualità of Work, Physica-Verlag. A Sprinter Company, TD No. 684 (August 2008). 
L. ARCIERO, C. BIANCOTTI, L. D'AURIZIO and C. IMPENNA, Exploring agent-based methods for the analysis 
of payment systems: A crisis model for StarLogo TNG, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation, v. 12, 1, TD No. 686 (August 2008). 
A. CALZA  and  A.  ZAGHINI,  Nonlinearities in the dynamics of the euro area demand for M1, 
Macroeconomic Dynamics, v. 13, 1, pp. 1-19, TD No. 690 (September 2008). 
L. FRANCESCO and A. SECCHI, Technological change and the households’ demand for currency, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, v. 56, 2, pp. 222-230, TD No. 697 (December 2008). 
G. ASCARI and T. ROPELE, Trend inflation, taylor principle, and indeterminacy, Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, v. 41, 8, pp. 1557-1584, TD No. 708 (May 2007). S. COLAROSSI and A. ZAGHINI, Gradualism, transparency and the improved operational framework: a 
look at overnight volatility transmission, International Finance, v. 12, 2, pp. 151-170, TD No. 710 
(May 2009). 
M. BUGAMELLI, F. SCHIVARDI and R. ZIZZA, The euro and firm restructuring, in A. Alesina e F. Giavazzi 
(eds): Europe and the Euro, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, TD No. 716 (June 2009). 
B. HALL, F. LOTTI and J. MAIRESSE, Innovation and productivity in SMEs: empirical evidence for Italy, 




A. PRATI and M. SBRACIA,  Uncertainty and currency crises: evidence from survey data, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, v, 57, 6, pp. 668-681, TD No. 446 (July 2002). 
L. MONTEFORTE and S. SIVIERO, The Economic Consequences of Euro Area Modelling Shortcuts, Applied 
Economics, v. 42, 19-21, pp. 2399-2415, TD No. 458 (December 2002). 
S. MAGRI, Debt maturity choice of nonpublic Italian firms  , Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, v.42, 
2-3, pp. 443-463, TD No. 574 (January 2006). 
R. BRONZINI and P. PISELLI, Determinants of long-run regional productivity with geographical spillovers: 
the role of R&D, human capital and public infrastructure, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, v. 39, 2, pp.187-199,  TD No. 597 (September 2006). 
E. IOSSA and G. PALUMBO, Over-optimism and lender liability in the consumer credit market, Oxford 
Economic Papers,  v. 62, 2, pp. 374-394, TD No. 598 (September 2006). 
S. NERI and A. NOBILI, The transmission of US monetary policy to the euro area, International Finance, v. 
13, 1, pp. 55-78, TD No. 606 (December 2006). 
F. ALTISSIMO, R. CRISTADORO, M. FORNI, M. LIPPI and G. VERONESE, New Eurocoin: Tracking Economic 
Growth in Real Time, Review of Economics and Statistics, v. 92, 4, pp. 1024-1034, TD No. 631 
(June 2007). 
A. CIARLONE, P. PISELLI and G. TREBESCHI, Emerging Markets' Spreads and Global Financial Conditions, 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, v. 19, 2, pp. 222-239, TD No. 
637 (June 2007). 
U. ALBERTAZZI and L. GAMBACORTA, Bank profitability and taxation, Journal of Banking and Finance, v. 
34, 11, pp. 2801-2810,  TD No. 649 (November 2007). 
M.  IACOVIELLO  and S.  NERI,  Housing market spillovers: evidence from an estimated DSGE model, 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, v. 2, 2, pp. 125-164, TD No. 659 (January 2008). 
F. BALASSONE, F. MAURA and S. ZOTTERI, Cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables in the EU, Empirica, TD 
No. 671, v. 37, 4, pp. 381-402  (June 2008). 
F. D'AMURI, O. GIANMARCO I.P. and P. GIOVANNI, The labor market impact of immigration on the western 
german labor market in the 1990s, European Economic Review, v. 54, 4, pp. 550-570, TD No. 
687 (August 2008). 
A. ACCETTURO, Agglomeration and growth: the effects of commuting costs, Papers in Regional Science, v. 
89, 1, pp. 173-190, TD No. 688 (September 2008). 
S. NOBILI and G. PALAZZO, Explaining and forecasting bond risk premiums, Financial Analysts Journal, v. 
66, 4, pp. 67-82, TD No. 689 (September 2008). 
A.  B.  ATKINSON  and  A.  BRANDOLINI,  On analysing the world distribution of income, World Bank 
Economic Review , v. 24, 1 , pp. 1-37, TD No. 701 (January 2009). 
R. CAPPARIELLO and R. ZIZZA, Dropping the Books and Working Off the Books, Labour, v. 24, 2, pp. 139-
162 ,TD No. 702 (January 2009). 
C. NICOLETTI and C. RONDINELLI, The (mis)specification of discrete duration models with unobserved 
heterogeneity: a Monte Carlo study, Journal of Econometrics, v. 159, 1, pp. 1-13, TD No. 705 
(March 2009). 
L. FORNI, A. GERALI and M. PISANI, Macroeconomic effects of greater competition in the service sector: 
the case of Italy, Macroeconomic Dynamics, v. 14, 5, pp. 677-708, TD No. 706 (March 2009). 
V. DI GIACINTO, G. MICUCCI and P. MONTANARO, Dynamic macroeconomic effects of public capital: 
evidence from regional Italian data, Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, v. 69, 1, pp. 29-
66, TD No. 733 (November 2009). 
F. COLUMBA, L. GAMBACORTA and P. E. MISTRULLI, Mutual Guarantee institutions and small business 
finance, Journal of Financial Stability, v. 6, 1, pp. 45-54, TD No. 735 (November 2009). A. GERALI, S. NERI, L. SESSA and F. M. SIGNORETTI, Credit and banking in a DSGE model of the Euro 
Area, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, v. 42, 6, pp. 107-141, TD No. 740 (January 2010). 
M. AFFINITO and E. TAGLIAFERRI, Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy, Journal 
of Financial Stability, v. 6, 4, pp. 189-202, TD No. 741 (January 2010). 
S. FEDERICO, Outsourcing versus integration at home or abroad and firm heterogeneity, Empirica, v. 37, 
1, pp. 47-63, TD No. 742 (February 2010). 
V. DI GIACINTO, On vector autoregressive modeling in space and time, Journal of Geographical Systems, v. 12, 
2, pp. 125-154,  TD No. 746 (February 2010). 
S. MOCETTI and C. PORELLO, How does immigration affect native internal mobility? new evidence from 
Italy, Regional Science and Urban Economics, v. 40, 6, pp. 427-439, TD No. 748 (March 2010). 
A.  DI  CESARE  and  G.  GUAZZAROTTI,  An analysis of the determinants of credit default swap spread 
changes before and during the subprime financial turmoil, Journal of Current Issues in Finance, 
Business and Economics, v. 3, 4, pp., TD No. 749 (March 2010). 
P. CIPOLLONE, P. MONTANARO and P. SESTITO, Value-added measures in Italian high schools: problems 
and findings, Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, v. 69, 2, pp. 81-114, TD No. 754 
(March 2010). 
A. BRANDOLINI, S. MAGRI and T. M SMEEDING, Asset-based measurement of poverty, Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, v. 29, 2 , pp. 267-284, TD No. 755 (March 2010). 
G. CAPPELLETTI, A Note on rationalizability and restrictions on beliefs, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical 
Economics, v. 10, 1, pp. 1-11,TD No. 757 (April 2010). 
S. DI ADDARIO and D. VURI, Entrepreneurship and market size. the case of young college graduates in 
Italy, Labour Economics, v. 17, 5, pp. 848-858, TD No. 775 (September 2010). 
A. CALZA and A. ZAGHINI, Sectoral money demand and the great disinflation in the US, Journal of Money, 




S. DI ADDARIO, Job search in thick markets, Journal of Urban Economics, v. 69, 3, pp. 303-318, TD No. 
605 (December 2006). 
E.  CIAPANNA,  Directed matching with endogenous markov probability: clients or competitors?, The 
RAND Journal of Economics, v. 42, 1, pp. 92-120, TD No. 665 (April 2008). 
L. FORNI, A. GERALI and M. PISANI, The Macroeconomics of Fiscal Consolidation in a Monetary Union: 
the Case of Italy, in Luigi Paganetto (ed.), Recovery after the crisis. Perspectives and policies, 
VDM Verlag Dr. Muller, TD No. 747 (March 2010). 
A. DI CESARE and G. GUAZZAROTTI, An analysis of the determinants of credit default swap changes before 
and during the subprime financial turmoil, in Barbara L. Campos and Janet P. Wilkins (eds.), The 
Financial Crisis: Issues in Business, Finance and Global Economics, New York, Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., TD No. 749 (March 2010). 
G. GRANDE and I. VISCO, A public guarantee of a minimum return to defined contribution pension scheme 
members, The Journal of Risk, v. 13, 3, pp. 3-43, TD No. 762 (June 2010). 
P. DEL GIOVANE, G. ERAMO and A. NOBILI, Disentangling demand and supply in credit developments: a 
survey-based analysis for Italy, Journal of Banking and Finance, v. 35, 10, pp. 2719-2732, TD No. 
764 (June 2010). 
M. TABOGA,  Under/over-valuation of the stock market and cyclically adjusted earnings, International 
Finance, v. 14, 1, pp. 135-164, TD No. 780 (December 2010). 
S. NERI, Housing, consumption and monetary policy: how different are the U.S. and the Euro area?, Journal 





M. BUGAMELLI and A. ROSOLIA, Produttività e concorrenza estera, Rivista di politica economica, TD No. 
578 (February 2006). 
G. DE BLASIO and G. NUZZO, Historical traditions of civicness and local economic development, Journal of 
Regional Science,  TD No. 591 (May 2006). F. CINGANO and A. ROSOLIA, People I know: job search and social networks, Journal of Labor Economics, 
TD No. 600 (September 2006). 
F. SCHIVARDI and E. VIVIANO, Entry barriers in retail trade, Economic Journal, TD No. 616 (February 2007). 
G. FERRERO, A. NOBILI and P. PASSIGLIA, Assessing excess liquidity in the Euro Area: the role of sectoral 
distribution of money, Applied Economics, TD No. 627 (April 2007). 
P. E. MISTRULLI, Assessing financial contagion in the interbank market: maximun entropy versus observed 
interbank lending patterns, Journal of Banking & Finance, TD No. 641 (September 2007). 
Y. ALTUNBAS, L. GAMBACORTA and D. MARQUÉS, Securitisation and the bank lending channel, European 
Economic Review, TD No. 653 (November 2007). 
M. BUGAMELLI and F. PATERNÒ, Output growth volatility and remittances, Economica, TD No. 673 (June 
2008). 
V.  DI  GIACINTO  e M.  PAGNINI,  Local and global agglomeration patterns: two econometrics-based   
indicators, Regional Science and Urban Economics,  TD No. 674 (June 2008). 
G. BARONE and F. CINGANO, Service regulation and growth: evidence from OECD countries, Economic 
Journal,  TD No. 675 (June 2008). 
S. MOCETTI, Educational choices and the selection process before and after compulsory school, Education 
Economics, TD No. 691 (September 2008). 
P.  SESTITO  and  E.  VIVIANO,  Reservation wages: explaining some puzzling regional patterns, Labour,   
TD No. 696 (December 2008). 
P.  PINOTTI,  M.  BIANCHI  and  P.  BUONANNO,  Do immigrants cause crime?, Journal of the European 
Economic Association, TD No. 698 (December 2008). 
R. GIORDANO and P. TOMMASINO, What determines debt intolerance? The role of political and monetary 
institutions, European Journal of Political Economy, TD No. 700 (January 2009). 
F. LIPPI and A. NOBILI, Oil and the macroeconomy: a quantitative structural analysis, Journal of European 
Economic Association, TD No. 704 (March 2009). 
F. CINGANO and P. PINOTTI, Politicians at work. The private returns and social costs of political connections, 
Journal of the European Economic Association, TD No. 709 (May 2009). 
Y. ALTUNBAS, L. GAMBACORTA, and D. MARQUÉS-IBÁÑEZ, Bank risk and monetary policy, Journal of 
Financial Stability, TD No. 712 (May 2009). 
P. ANGELINI, A. NOBILI e C. PICILLO, The interbank market after August 2007: What has changed, and 
why?, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, TD No. 731 (October 2009). 
G. BARONE and S. MOCETTI, Tax morale and public spending inefficiency, International Tax and Public 
Finance,  TD No. 732 (November 2009). 
L. FORNI, A. GERALI and M. PISANI, The macroeconomics of fiscal consolidations in euro area countries, 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, TD No. 747 (March 2010). 
G. BARONE, R. FELICI and M. PAGNINI, Switching costs in local credit markets, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization,  TD No. 760 (June 2010). 
G. BARONE and S. MOCETTI, With a little help from abroad: the effect of low-skilled immigration on the 
female labour supply, Labour Economics, TD No. 766 (July 2010). 
S.  MAGRI  and  R.  PICO,  The rise of risk-based pricing of mortgage interest rates in Italy, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, TD No. 778 (October 2010). 
A.  ACCETTURO and G. DE BLASIO,  Policies for local development: an evaluation of Italy’s “Patti 
Territoriali”, Regional Science and Urban Economics,  TD No. 789 (January 2006). 
E. COCOZZA and P. PISELLI, Testing for east-west contagion in the European banking sector during the 
financial crisis, in R. Matoušek; D. Stavárek (eds.), Financial Integration in the European Union, 
Taylor & Francis,  TD No. 790 (February 2011). 
S. NERI and T. ROPELE, Imperfect information, real-time data and monetary policy in the Euro area, The 
Economic Journal,  TD No. 802 (March 2011). 
 